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OF SEPTEMBER 11: 
LIMITING THE LEGACY OF THE 
ANTI-TERRORISM ACT 
David M. Paciocco* 
The Anti-Terrorism Act is necessary legislation. The desire to defend against 
the obscenity of random acts of mass violence has, however, supported the 
abridgement of civil liberties. Indeed, it has ushered in the creation of provi-
sions that, in my opinion, should be found to violate the Charter in a manner 
that cannot be saved by section 1. Included among those sections are the fol-
lowing: 
(1)  The definition in section 83.01(b) of “terrorist group” enables the Crown to 
secure conviction of persons of a variety of offences relating to aiding terrorist 
groups, without ever having to prove that the group aided is in fact a “terrorist 
group.” All that must be proved is that the group assisted has been listed in regula-
tions through an administrative act. This makes the definition of terrorist group 
“overbroad” and contravenes the presumption of innocence. Courts should strike 
section 83.01(b) of the statute. This will not render the aiding offences unconstitu-
tional but will make it necessary for the Crown, if it wishes to secure a conviction 
for one of those offences, to prove that an alleged “terrorist group” is in fact en-
gaged in terrorist activities or is associated with a group that is. 
(2)  The preventative detention and recognizance provisions, while not unconstitu-
tional per se, do not, in my opinion, impose a sufficiently high standard of proof on 
the Crown to satisfy principles of fundamental justice related to the presumption of 
innocence. All the Crown need prove before detaining someone or securing recog-
nizance conditions is that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the accused 
is involved in terrorist activity. Based on precedent and principle, the standard of 
reasonable suspicion should not be enough to deprive someone of his or her liberty 
in this way. Moreover, the absence of a power in the judge to release detainees on 
conditions when matters have been adjourned could contravene the Charter. 
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(3)  The investigative detention provisions, while not per se contravening self-
incrimination protections, will be used unconstitutionally if employed in an effort to 
require persons to provide incriminatory information about themselves. Section 7 
may be available in such cases to prevent the investigative detention from being 
undertaken. More importantly, the provisions are, in my opinion, unconstitutional 
per se because, through the co-option of judges in the process of investigation, fun-
damental principles of judicial impartiality and independence are hopelessly com-
promised. 
There will be tremendous incentive for courts to find ways to uphold these provi-
sions, and they could well survive Charter challenge given the open-textured na-
ture of constitutional adjudication. If this happens, the biggest threat to civil 
liberties emerging from the Anti-Terrorism Act may not be the operation of these 
sections; it could well be “creeping incrementalism.” If these and other excep-
tional measures are woven into the fabric of Canadian criminal law, our tolerance 
for such practices can be expected to lead to similar initiatives being undertaken in 
other contexts. If impugned provisions in this legislation are indeed upheld, they 
must be upheld grudgingly, and because the context is exceptional — not because 
they reflect acceptable law enforcement initiatives. If the impugned provisions of 
this legislation are upheld on any other basis, Canadian civil liberties and the 
Charter can be counted in the collateral damage from September 11. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
That Canada would pass an Anti-Terrorism Act was inevitable, even before 
September 11.1 Terrorism is a global problem that has for some time been the 
subject of international dialogue and government commitment. It is true, of 
course, that long before this statute was passed, there was a surfeit of offences 
that made acts of terrorism illegal,2 as well as an imposing array of investiga-
tive powers. Still, it is understandable that the government perceived our law to 
be inadequate.  
First, our criminal law institutions developed primarily on the assumption 
that crime would be committed by individuals or small domestic, non-political 
groups. Terrorism, by contrast, is a highly political, organized activity. The 
Anti-Terrorism Act3 attempts to adapt the criminal law to deal with this reality 
                                                                                                                                                              
1
 See the comments of Mosely in “Concluding Comments from the Department of Justice” 
in Daniels et al. (eds.), The Security of Freedom: Essays on Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Bill (2001), 
at 436. 
2
 See Roach, “The New Terrorism Offences and the Criminal Law” in Daniels et al. (eds.), 
The Security of Freedom: Essays on Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Bill (2001), at 152-54. 
3
  S.C. 2001, c. 41. 
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in a more comprehensive way than the anti-gang legislation did, by creating a 
broad range of what are, in truth, association-based offences. 
Second, keeping with traditions of restraint and respect for individual liberty, 
criminal law in this country has, for the most part, been reactive. The criminal 
law tends to kick in only after crime has occurred. It uses two central strategies. 
It encourages law-abiding values by denouncing criminal conduct through the 
trial process and the ceremony of sentencing, and it attempts to deter by punish-
ing offenders as examples to others. These are self-defeating strategies to use 
for those who will not attorn to our societal norms, who will not be deterred, 
who believe they are at war and who are prepared to die in acts of spectacular 
and numbing destruction. The felt need for more proactive legislation is under-
standable. 
Third, our criminal law process was designed on the assumption that crimi-
nal acts were discrete, historical acts. In such a milieu, subject to collateral 
concerns about protecting the identity of complainants, or in rare cases, the 
constrained protection of police investigative methods,4 it is possible to have 
open and candid processes in which all available information is put on public 
display. In the terrorism context there is apt to be ongoing criminal investiga-
tion, and an international exchange of information. These differences require 
special rules relating to the preservation of confidential information. 
In these circumstances, the Anti-Terrorism Act is not merely superfluous leg-
islation. Its focus on association, planning, assistance, financing, espionage, 
investigative method, and on the protection of investigations by preventing the 
disclosure of some information, was both predictable and appropriate.  
Having said all of this, there are many things in the Anti-Terrorism Act that 
are troubling. Of lesser note, we see the government using techniques and tools 
that are probably not constitutionally objectionable but which are decidedly 
contrary to the values that helped make our criminal justice system an enviable 
one. The government is growing too comfortable, in my opinion, with things 
like imposing consecutive sentencing requirements, giving statutory emphasis 
to select aggravating sentencing factors in an effort to increase sentencing 
ranges, and taking measures to delay parole.5 Given the probable inability to 
                                                                                                                                                              
4
 See R. v. Mentuck (2001), 205 D.L.R. (4th) 512 (S.C.C.). 
5
 Section 743.6 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, as am. is amended to require 
judges to order no release until the lesser of half the sentence of ten years has been served, unless 
the judge is satisfied that this is not needed to meet the principles of sentencing. I am on record as 
opposing a parole system in preference to real-time sentencing, so one might think that I would like 
provisions that delay parole. I am not, however, in favour of longer sentences, nor of measures that 
either require or encourage judges to take steps to be harsher than they otherwise would be. The 
treatment of parole in the Anti-Terrorism Act perpetuates the unrealistic belief that getting tough on 
crimes that already expose actors to lengthy penalties will deter those crimes. This discreditable 
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effectively deter terrorism by threatening punishment, these provisions seem 
pointless, at the cost of perpetuating a bad habit of “getting tough on crime” by 
attempting to ratchet up sentencing.  
We again see the use of reverse onuses during bail hearings, and the use of a 
presumption to convenience the government case, even though it is better able 
to prove the presumed fact than an accused person will be to disprove it.6 Re-
grettably, the government continues its practice of attempting to Charter-proof 7 
legislation by littering enactments with self-serving preambles.8  
Other matters, several of which will be the subject of this paper, are not 
merely troubling; they rise to constitutional significance. This should be dis-
turbing not just to defence lawyers but to all Canadians, altogether apart from 
ultimate questions of Charter validity. The price Canadians have paid for the 
modicum of security the Anti-Terrorism Act will be able to provide is great. 
Without question, we have breached fundamental principles of criminal law, 
compromised liberty and freedom, conferred increased power on state agents to 
invade privacy and to deprive persons of liberty, hampered the freedom to 
associate,9 and increased the risks associated with racial or religious profiling 
and discrimination. Even those of us who choose to endorse this legislation 
must therefore do so with a deep sense of regret. We should lament the reality 
that to the marginal extent that we have clothed ourselves in security, we have 
done so by altering, if not renting, the fabric of our law, and by refashioning it 
into a decidedly unflattering robe. We have increased the risk of abuse of 
power.  
It is true what the stauncher defenders of the Anti-Terrorism Act say. It could 
have been worse. It is obvious from reading the Act that the Charter has already 
                                                                                                                                                              
assumption is indulged at the cost of increasing the costs of incarceration and, more importantly, of 
pointlessly denying liberty. 
6
 Subsection 3(4) of the Anti-Terrorism Act is a mandatory presumption that will enable the 
Crown to establish jurisdiction in a Canadian court by filing a certificate that purports to verify the 
identity of victims as UN personnel or internationally protected persons.  
7
 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. 
8
 It was contrary to the principle of legality to incorporate by reference, as offences, things 
not described in the legislation but rather spelled out in 10 different international covenants that 
most Canadian lawyers have never even heard of. Others will be troubled by s. 38.01 of the Canada 
Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5, as am., which requires “every participant,” including defence 
lawyers, to notify the Attorney General as soon as possible of any information that she “believes is 
sensitive information.” This is, in some measure, a defence disclosure obligation. 
9
 See Roach, “The New Terrorism Offences and the Criminal Law” in Daniels et al. (eds.), 
The Security of Freedom: Essays on Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Bill (2001), at 152. While member-
ship in a terrorist group is not criminalized, participation is, as are acts that would fund the group. 
This is de facto criminalization of membership. 
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made a significant contribution.10 It has slowed what otherwise may have been 
the impetus to be forceful and effective at all costs. We should not take too 
much comfort, however, in the fact that things could have been worse. After all, 
that an earthquake is generally a greater natural disaster than a volcano eruption 
does little solace for those who are ankle-deep in the lava. 
Apparently unlike the government of Canada, I see this legislation as excep-
tional. It deals with a different kind of threat than the criminal law is accus-
tomed to addressing, and with different tools. Whether legislation was on the 
cards or not, the Anti-Terrorism Act was passed in an atmosphere of crisis that 
created deep public approval, enabling the government politically to do almost 
anything it willed. I, for one, would have been much more comfortable had this 
statute been presented as exceptional. I wish it had remained a self-contained 
enactment, “The Anti-Terrorism Act,” even replete with its stirring call-to-arms 
preamble. Then we would have known it was an unfortunate and unique aberra-
tion from our customary legal restraint, wrought only by unspeakable acts. 
Instead, by design, its provisions are woven into other statutes, including the 
Criminal Code of Canada, and the Canada Evidence Act. Its tools — including 
things like investigative detention,11 pre-offence detention and conditions of 
recognizance,12 the criminalization of acts of preparation,13 the use of regula-
tions to absolve the Crown of the need to prove essential elements of offences,14 
ministerial certificates preventing meaningful judicial review15 — all these 
                                                                                                                                                              
10
 See, for example, the certificate provisions that enable the Minister to prevent disclosure 
of certain information during criminal trials. Parliament has provided expressly that the cost of 
doing so could be the staying of the charges against the accused. While this alone is not a guarantee 
that these provisions are constitutional, it is obvious that some consideration that might not other-
wise have been expected was given to full answer-and-defence considerations.  
11
 The “sunset clause” arguably does paint this provision as exceptional. Its inclusion could 
deter this kind of initiative from being taken up elsewhere. 
12
 Again, s. 83.3, the most visible pre-offence detention and recognizance provision, is also 
subject to a sunset clause. Its precedential impact will not be blunted by this, since a little known 
amendment in the Anti-Terrorism Act to s. 810.01 of the Criminal Code, which is not subject to the 
sunset clause, permits preventative detention and the imposition of recognizance orders, altogether 
apart from s. 83.3 This is discussed in detail below. 
13
 See the amendment creating s. 22 of the Official Secrets Act, which makes preparation to 
engage in a broad array of vague offences, criminal. 
14
 I am referring to the way the “terrorist list” is used in the legislation. This is discussed in 
detail below. 
15
 Although amendments to Bill C-36 permit claims of public policy immunity to be re-
viewed, the procedure where s. 38.13 certificates are issued may be too circumscribed, and thereby 
constitutionally infirm. The judge cannot balance competing interests. Once a judge has determined 
that the information was received in confidence from a foreign entity, or that it is “related to 
national defence or security,” the review is done and the certificate must be upheld. This provision 
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things and others risk becoming part of the fabric of Canadian law when they 
should stand isolate and exceptional. Kent Roach expressed this same fear 
eloquently: 
The criminal law has a tendency to replicate itself . . . We can expect that the incur-
sions on fundamental values in Bill C-36 will be a model the next time another 
menace becomes pressing, especially if they are found to be Charter-proof. The 
minimum standards of conduct in the Charter are quickly becoming the maximum 
standards of restraint that we can expect from our governments.16 
Roach is absolutely right. There is “creeping incrementalism” at work in the 
development of the criminal law, one that is disrespectful of a tradition of 
restraint in using crime as a solution to our social problems. One can see it in 
the tendency of commentators who support even the more problematic aspects 
of this legislation to justify them by finding analogies for having done it before, 
as though previous acts of disrespect for fundamental principle validate subse-
quent acts of disrespect. As for the future, I was not in the least surprised to 
hear on CBC Radio, the day after the first draft of the legislation was an-
nounced, a peace officer from Quebec saying that if similar powers were pro-
vided in the “war against gangs,” they could put an end to the gang problem. 
That those charged with public security will covet these kinds of initiatives to 
deal with other law enforcement problems is to be expected in a legal system 
grounded on precedent. It is even more to be expected, as Roach notes, when a 
Charter challenge to an adopted practice is brought and fails. The government 
should worry when a Charter challenge is beat back that perhaps it is legislating 
on the periphery of what is acceptable and should retreat a bit; instead, the 
constitutional victory tends to be seen as a vote of approval for the impugned 
technique or measure. This statute, especially in those provisions that will 
survive constitutional challenge, therefore poses a deep risk of causing further 
creeping incrementalism as new threats, real or exaggerated, capture the popu-
lar imagination. Even those things in this statute that survive constitutional 
challenge should be handled with care and treated as legal aberrations, not as 
precedents for future legislative initiative. 
There are, indeed, a number of potential constitutional challenges relevant to 
criminal law.17 I cannot treat all of them adequately, even in a paper of such 
                                                                                                                                                              
does not create review. It creates the facade of review. It would have been better were the review 
process to have been omitted, for it is a disingenuous one. 
16
 “The Dangers of a Charter-Proof and Crime-Based Response to Terrorism” in Daniels et 
al. (eds.), The Security of Freedom: Essays on Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Bill, (2001), at 137. 
17
 I will not attempt to deal with those complaints that fall more fully into other branches of 
civil liberty, such as whether the definition of “terrorist activity” will impede social protest, or 
whether the Access to Information Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. A-1, has been improperly compromised, or 
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unseemly length as this one.18 I have therefore chosen to concentrate on three 
general issues I perceive to be of particular importance and of general interest 
to criminal lawyers: the “terrorist group” offences, the “recognizance with 
conditions” and the “investigative hearings.”  
It is not possible, in a system of shifting constitutional ground created by no-
tions of deference and dialogue, to be dogmatic about whether a provision is 
unconstitutional,19 but I will accept the invitation that has been extended to me 
and nonetheless venture a personal opinion:  
• I think that the use of a “terrorist list” to define whether an element of 
the terrorist group offences has been met, is unconstitutional, and I 
doubt it can be saved using section 1.  
• I think that one of the “recognizance with conditions” provisions, sec-
tion 83.3, might be unconstitutional, at least in part, because of the pal-
try standards of proof that it uses to empower peace officers to arrest, 
                                                                                                                                                              
whether freedom of association is limited unconstitutionally, or with the treatment of charitable 
status. 
18
 For example,  
• there are serious issues surrounding the obligation imposed on lawyers to report suspicious 
financial transactions by their clients, or to disclose information about terrorist property 
(see Canadian Bar Association, Submissions on Bill C-36 Anti-Terrorism Act (2001), at 
29-30); 
• it has to be wondered whether amendments to permit wiretap orders to be issued even 
when other methods of investigation have not been tried, and then to have those orders 
last for up to a year without renewal, violate s. 8; 
• it has to be wondered whether the power of the mysterious Communications Security Es-
tablishment to wiretap without warrant, calls that originate in or terminate in Canada if di-
rected at foreign entities located outside Canada, is acceptable. See Friedland, “Police 
Powers in Bill C-36” in Daniels et al. (eds.), The Security of Freedom: Essays on Cana-
da’s Anti-Terrorism Bill (2001), at 274-76.  
• There may be void for vagueness or overbreadth issues, or mens rea or even actus reus 
challenges to some of the offences. See Stuart “The Dangers of Quick Fix Legislation in 
the Criminal Law: The Anti-Terrorism Bill C-36 Should be Withdrawn” in Daniels et al. 
(eds.), The Security of Freedom: Essays on Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Bill (2001), at 276.  
 I will say as an aside that there is one provision that has attracted great criticism on the 
mens rea front that I do not believe to be problematic. It appears in at least two sections, 83.18 and 
83.21, which are essentially aiding and abetting offences. This provision makes it an offence to 
engage in conduct for the purpose of assisting in a terrorist activity, “whether or not . . . the accused 
knows the specific nature of the terrorist activity that may be facilitated or carried out.” This caveat 
was inserted to prevent individuals from claiming ignorance by not inquiring into the precise nature 
of the activity that they intend to assist. These provisions are, in my opinion, unobjectionable on the 
basis of “wilful blindness” reasoning. It is enough if the accused knows the possible range of 
offences he has agreed to assist without having to know the precise activity that is being intention-
ally assisted. See DPP for Northern Ireland v. Maxwell, [1978] 3 All E.R. 1140 (H.L.). 
19
 See Paciocco, “Competing Constitutional Rights in an Age of Deference: A Bad Time to 
be Accused” (2001), 14 S.C.L.R. (2d) 111. 
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and to enable Crown Attornies to obtain restraints on liberty in the form 
of conditions.20 I also think that the failure to provide for interim release 
during adjournments could be unconstitutional. 
• I think that “investigative detentions” will survive self-incrimination 
challenges, although their utility will be limited by self-incrimination 
considerations. The government will be disallowed from using this 
process if its purpose in doing so is to obtain self-incriminating informa-
tion from a suspect. There is, however, a more imposing, general prob-
lem. I think the investigative hearing provisions should be found 
unconstitutional in their entirety because they co-opt judges in criminal 
investigations, undermining the appearance of their impartiality and in-
dependence. 
II.  THE TERRORIST LIST IN THE “TERRORIST GROUP” OFFENCES 
1. The Problem Summarized 
Imagine that Parliament were to pass a statute directing courts to accept as 
having been proved beyond a reasonable doubt for the purpose of a criminal 
prosecution, any fact that the government proclaims by regulation to be true. 
Such a statute would obviously be unconstitutional. This is, in substance, what 
Parliament has done with several new offences which have, as one of their 
essential elements, dealing with or supporting terrorist groups.21 In order to 
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 As explained below, there are two such provisions, s. 83.3 and amendments to s. 810.01. 
21
 A number of these provisions appear to be designed to cripple the “group” by depriving it 
of services or support. These provisions include no ulterior mens rea components for persons aiding 
the group. Those sections are subs. 83.03(b) (making property or financial services available to a 
terrorist group); s. 83.08 (a provision largely redundant to subs. 83.03(b), making it an offence to 
deal in property owned or controlled by a terrorist group or to facilitate such a transaction); s. 83.1 
(failing to disclose possession of property belonging to a terrorist group, or information in one’s 
possession relating to transactions involving property belonging to a terrorist group); and s. 83.11 
(failing to comply with the audit requirement on listed financial organizations relating to property 
owned or controlled by “listed entities”). Section 83.2 is a particularly troubling illustration. It 
elevates any indictable offence committed on behalf of a “terrorist group” to a terrorist offence 
punishable by life in prison, whether the offence is connected with terrorist activities or not. 
 Other terrorist group offences created by the Act focus more on the actor than the group, 
requiring an ulterior mens rea that would make the conduct inherently blameworthy. These offenc-
es make criminal those relations with a “terrorist group” that are undertaken for the purpose of 
assisting that group in its terrorist activities. See, for example, s. 83.03(b) (“knowing that [the 
finances or services] will be used . . . by a terrorist group”); s. 83.18 (“knowingly” participating in 
or contributing to any terrorist activity “for the purpose of enhancing the ability of any terrorist 
group to facilitate or carry out a terrorist activity”); s. 83.21 (“knowingly” instructing persons to 
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prove that the entity dealt with or supported is a “terrorist group,” the Crown 
need not call evidence to establish this fact beyond a reasonable doubt; all the 
Crown need do is prove that the Governor in Council has included that group 
on its “terrorist list.” This contravenes the presumption of innocence, and cre-
ates, in my opinion, a regime that suffers from unconstitutional overbreadth.  
To be clear, the many offences that are implicated in this way are not per se 
unconstitutional. What is unconstitutional, in my opinion, is the definition in 
subsection 83.01(b), the provision that effectively enables the Crown to use a 
government list as a substitute for proving an essential fact. If subsection 
83.01(b) is struck down, the implicated offences could survive, but the Crown 
would be forced to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the group that has 
been aided or supported in fact has as one of its purposes engaging in terrorist 
activities. 
2. The Impugned Provision — Section 83.01(b) 
With emphasis added, the suspect definition in section 83.01 states: 
“terrorist group” means 
(a)  an entity that has as one of its purposes or activities facilitating or carry-
ing out any terrorist activity, or 
(b)  a listed entity 
and includes an association of such entities.22 
To illustrate the impact of this provision more precisely, consider subsection 
83.03(b) and how it could be prosecuted. Subsection 83.03(b) provides: 
83.03 Every one who, directly or indirectly, collects property, provides or invites a 
person to provide, or makes available property or financial or other related services 
. . . 
(b)  knowing that, in whole or in part, they will be used or will benefit a ter-
rorist group, 
is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable for imprisonment for a term of not 
more than 10 years.23  
                                                                                                                                                              
assist a terrorist group “for the purpose of enhancing the ability of any terrorist group to facilitate or 
carry out a terrorist activity”).  
22
  Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, as am. 
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In proving the essential element of this offence — that the group being given 
property or financial or other related services is a “terrorist group” — the 
Crown can use either the section 83.01(a) definition and prove in court that the 
group is in fact “an entity that has as one of its purposes facilitating or carrying 
out any terrorist activity,”24 or the Crown can rely on the section 83.01(b) defi-
nition and simply prove that the group has been listed by the government.25 The 
result of this latter option is that subsection 83.03(b) does not confine itself to 
acts of financing groups that have been involved in terrorist activities. The 
section catches acts of financing any groups that the government fears on rea-
sonable grounds may be terrorist groups.26 The heart of the matter is that, be-
cause of the way “terrorist group” is defined, persons stand the risk of being 
convicted of this offence without proof ever being offered of the actual activi-
ties of the group, and without anyone ever having to establish beyond a reason-
able doubt that the group really is a terrorist group. Through indirection and 
complicated drafting, the government has attempted to lower its standard of 
proof, and to save itself from discharging its full burden of proof with respect to 
each of the “terrorist group” offences.  
                                                                                                                                                              
23
 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, as am. As an aside, this particular section is likely in 
prima facie, but justifiable, violation of s. 2(a), freedom of association. 
24
 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, as am. 
25
  Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, as am. 
26
 Section 83.05 describes the scheme for creating “listed entities.” Groups are “listed” by 
the Governor in Council by regulation, on the recommendation of the Solicitor-General of Canada. 
Groups can be “listed” according to subs. 83.05(1) on the simple basis that “the Governor in 
Council is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe” either “(a)” that those groups have 
knowingly carried out, participated in, or facilitated terrorist activity, or “(b)” acted on behalf of a 
group referred to in “(a).” [Forget, for the moment, that this definition is broad enough to permit 
law firms to be listed for having acted on behalf of groups that the government believes have 
facilitated terrorist activities.] Reasonable grounds to believe, of course, is the standard typically 
used for obtaining a search warrant, not for establishing facts during trial.  
 While groups can challenge their listing, it is not a true appeal — it is a review, in which 
the most deferential review process known to law is engaged: the judge must simply determine “on 
the basis of the information available to the judge” whether it was reasonable for the Governor in 
Council to conclude that there were reasonable grounds to believe the group was involved in 
terrorist activity (s. 83.05(6)(d)). The review of the information can be done in private, on the basis 
of inadmissible evidence, which is summarized for the applicant in enough detail to enable the 
applicant to understand the reasons for decision. The section does not therefore require enough 
detail for the applicant to respond to the listing. A hearing will only be held if requested, and it is 
contemplated that the process can take up to 120 days to reach a hearing (s. 83.05).  
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3. The Constitutional Foundation for the Challenge 
(a) The Presumption of Innocence 
In my view, this technique offends the presumption of innocence guaranteed 
in section 11(d) of the Charter. The Supreme Court of Canada has held that one 
of the corollaries of that provision is the obligation on the Crown to bear the 
burden and to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.27 That the statutory 
scheme obviates the need to prove an element of the offence in a fashion that 
comports to these basic constitutional requirements is obvious.  
To reinforce my concern that section 11(d) is violated by the kind of defini-
tion used in section 83.01, consider the test used to determine whether a legal 
presumption violates section 11(d). A provision will do so in any case where it 
permits the conviction of the accused in the face of a reasonable doubt, includ-
ing doubt about one of the elements of the offence.28 Imagine that the Crown 
presents its case to a jury in a subsection 83.03(b) prosecution. It proves that 
the accused intentionally provided financing to Co. A., knowing that Co. A is a 
listed group,29 but leads no evidence that Co. A. has as one of its purposes 
engaging in terrorist activities. Instead, all the Crown does is to file the gov-
ernment list. Would a responsible jury not be left in a reasonable doubt about 
whether Co. A. really was engaged in terrorist activities, particularly given that 
the list was compiled on a standard well below proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt or even the balance of probabilities? A reasonable jury would have a 
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 See Dubois v. R. (1985), 48 C.R. (3d) 193 (S.C.C.). 
28
 See R. v. Whyte [1988] 2 S.C.R. 3. 
29
 I am not entirely certain that proof that the accused knows the group to be listed is re-
quired, although I believe so. The relevant provisions tend to require the accused to knowingly 
engage in various acts of support or assistance to terrorist groups, but to what exactly does the 
“knowledge” requirement relate? Does it relate to knowingly engaging in an act that assists a group, 
or does it relate to knowing that the group assisted is a terrorist organization? Using ordinary 
principles of criminal law, the answer would be “both,” even in the absence of the word “knowing,” 
as the mens rea of knowledge with respect to conditions of an offence, like the status of the group 
dealt with, is implied in the case of a true crime. What causes me concern, however, is the fact that 
the “terrorist list” is published in the Canada Gazette. Once incorporated in a regulation, a group 
attains the status of a “terrorist group” through the operation of law, and the function of the Canada 
Gazette is not only to publish information, but to enable knowledge of the law to be deemed. To 
deem knowledge of the status of a group, however, would be entirely insensitive to the realities of 
commerce, even with respect to the s. 83.01(a) definition. Anyone dealing with an organization 
would have to confirm that it does not support terrorist activities, or risk conviction. With respect to 
the s. 83.01(b) definition, it would require anyone who engages in any financial dealings to become 
avid readers of a publication that has not yet made the best sellers list. The insertion of the word 
“knowingly” should be taken to relate not only to the act of assistance, but also to the status of the 
group assisted. 
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doubt on that matter, yet section 83.01(b) would require a conviction. Section 
11(d) is offended by the use of an administrative edict as replacement for proof. 
The government response to this argument will be highly technical. It will 
urge that I am misunderstanding the elements of the offences, and that what is 
prohibited by these sections is not only dealing with a group that has “as one of 
its purposes or activities facilitating or carrying out terrorist activities,” it also 
prohibits dealing with a group that is listed. In a formal sense this is true, but if 
all that is needed in order to avoid the burden of proving a central factual prem-
ise for an offence, is for the Governor in Council to deem that fact to exist, then 
form has triumphed over substance. To accept the legitimacy of this kind of 
technique would be to empower the government to deem by regulation that any 
fact normally central to an offence can be proved by simply pointing to legisla-
tion in which the government accepts that alleged fact to be so. This cannot be 
right. 
(b) Unconstitutional Overbreadth 
Even if this formalistic argument were to find favour with a court, it could 
not save this provision from a related but distinct challenge. The Supreme 
Court of Canada held in R. v. Heywood that criminal provisions violate section 
7 where they threaten liberty, and where they suffer from overbreadth: 
Overbreadth analysis looks at the means chosen by the state in relation to its 
purpose. In considering whether a legislative provision is overbroad, a court must 
ask the question: are those means necessary to achieve the State objective? If the 
State, in pursuing a legitimate objective, uses means which are broader than is nec-
essary to accomplish that objective, the principles of fundamental justice will be 
violated because the individual’s rights will have been limited for no reason. The 
effect of overbreadth is that in some applications the law is arbitrary or dispropor-
tionate.30 
The purpose of the terrorist group provisions is decidedly to prevent indi-
viduals from interacting with groups which are engaged in terrorist activities. 
Definition “(a)” of “terrorist group” captures precisely and exhaustively what 
the legislation is intended to address. It catches any “entity that has as one of its 
purposes or activities facilitating or carrying out any terrorist activity, and 
includes an association of such entities.” The only additional groups that defini-
tion “(b)” would add are groups the Crown cannot prove to be involved in 
facilitating or carrying out terrorist activities. Unless the presumption of inno-
cence is suspended, adding such groups to the definition can do nothing to 
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  [1994] 3 S.C.R. 761, at 792-93. 
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advance the “legitimate objective” of the terrorist group offences, and must 
therefore be constitutionally overbroad. If a proposition suffers from over-
breadth, ex hypothesi it cannot satisfy the minimal impairment requirement of 
section 1 and it is hopelessly unconstitutional. 
(c) The Long-Term Risk 
It is evident that the desire by the government to “err on the safe side” in 
terms of security caused it to adopt a technique to combat terrorism that “errs 
on the dangerous side” in terms of criminalizing conduct. If the technique 
employed in subsection 83.01 is accepted as constitutionally valid, it will pre-
sent itself again in the future in other legislative initiatives. Assailable proposi-
tions of fact will be convertible into unassailable propositions of law in order to 
reduce burdens of proof. If this is allowed to happen, one of the cross-border 
casualties of September 11 will be the presumption of innocence in Canada. 
Courts can rectify this without disabling valid government objectives. All that 
would be required is to ensure, before individuals are convicted, hopelessly 
stigmatized and subjected to the risk of significant punishment, that their guilt 
can be proved according to those minimum standards that are acceptable and 
integral to Canadian criminal law. 
III.  RECOGNIZANCE WITH CONDITIONS 
The new provision, section 83.3 of the Criminal Code of Canada created by 
the Anti-Terrorism Act, is one of the statute’s more controversial initiatives. 
Formally, the section has two functions. Its primary one is to empower provin-
cial court judges to impose conditions in order to prevent persons from carrying 
out apprehended terrorist activities. Its second function is to permit temporary 
arrest and detention, in order to prevent the carrying-out of terrorist activities, 
and to facilitate the making of recognizance orders. 
Section 83.3 is not the only provision in the legislation empowering courts to 
impose pre-offence recognizance conditions or to authorize pre-offence deten-
tion. Section 133(19) of the Anti-Terrorism Act has amended section 810.01 of 
the Criminal Code so that it, too, can be used to impose recognizance condi-
tions on suspected terrorists. Although section 133(19) has received virtually no 
public attention and is not subject to a sunset clause, for reasons discussed 
below it is in some respects more dangerous to civil liberties than section 83.3.  
In understanding the practical implications of these provisions, one should 
view them against the backdrop of the “inchoate offences” that are created by 
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the Act.31 The Anti-Terrorism Act is so aggressive in defining inchoate offences 
that it is almost impossible to conceive of a person who has not yet committed 
an inchoate offence, being central enough to a pending terrorist activity that a 
recognizance is needed to prevent that offence from occurring.32 In practice, 
then, these provisions will function to enable the apprehension of those who are 
suspected of having committed inchoate offences like conspiracy or encour-
agement, where there is not enough evidence available to charge them. Seen in 
this way, the provisions are intuitively offensive. They undermine the presump-
tion of innocence, and “punish” without cause. They are a way to extend the 
reach of criminal consequences where the requirements of full proof cannot be 
met.  
This is not how courts are likely to view these provisions. Courts will likely 
see them as “preventative” and not “punitive,” and this will prevent a finding 
that preventative detention and pre-offence recognizance conditions are per se 
unconstitutional.  
It is conceivable that section 83.3 could be struck down, not because it pro-
vides for pre-offence detention and the imposition of conditions, but rather 
because of the way in which it provides for pre-offence detention and pre-
offence recognizance. Its standards for detention and the imposition of recogni-
zance conditions may be too low to satisfy the Charter, but whether this is so is 
impossible to predict with any confidence. It may also be that a form of interim 
release on conditions will be built into section 83.3 to limit situations in which 
judges will use their powers of temporary detention. Even if these things hap-
pen, section 810.01 will likely remain available for use.  
1. The Scheme of Section 83.3 
In the ordinary course, the section 83.3 process will commence with the lay-
ing of an information by a peace officer, on the consent of the Attorney Gen-
eral. Once an information is laid, a provincial court judge may cause the person 
to appear.33 The judge can either issue a warrant for the arrest of the subject so 
that he will attend the section 83.3 hearing, or the judge may issue a sum-
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  “Inchoate offences” are complete before the harm is done, and include attempts.  
32
 For a comment on the nature of the inchoate offences in the Act, see Roach, “The New 
Terrorism Offences and the Criminal Law” in Daniels et al. (eds.), The Security of Freedom: 
Essays on Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Bill (2001), at 159-60. 
33
 It has been held with respect to section 810.01 of the Criminal Code, another recognizance 
provision, that the Charter requires the word “shall” to be read as “may” in order to permit the 
judge to exercise the discretion whether to issue process against the subject: R. v. Budreo (2000), 32 
C.R. (5th) 127, at 147-48 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal denied (2001), 271 N.R. 197 (note) (S.C.C.). 
The drafters of the Anti-Terrorism Act have accommodated this requirement in section 83.3. 
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mons.34 In exceptional circumstances, peace officers are empowered to arrest 
subjects without warrant, and without the consent of the Attorney General,35 but 
if the peace officer does so, she must either lay an information prior to the 
hearing, or release the subject.36 
Where an arrest does occur, whether pursuant to a judicial order or as a war-
rantless arrest by a peace officer, the subject must either be released or brought 
before a provincial court judge within 24 hours if one is available, or as soon as 
possible thereafter. When the subject is brought before the judge, it appears that 
the judge has two options. The judge may conduct the hearing at that first 
appearance and make a decision on whether to require the recognizance to be 
entered, or the judge may adjourn the proceedings and order the detention of 
the subject for up to 48 hours.37 The judge can order the detention of the subject 
during the adjournment period only if the Crown shows cause as to why the 
accused should not be released.38  
Significantly, no provision is made in section 83.3 for interim release on 
conditions pending the hearing. Moreover, it appears that no resort can be had 
to section 515, the general interim release provision of the Criminal Code,39 to 
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 Section 83.3(3) empowers a provincial court judge to “cause the person to appear before 
the provincial court judge.” Although, given the purpose behind the hearing, an arrest warrant will 
likely be the usual response, the language is broad enough to include a summons. Section 83.3(4) 
specifically contemplates the use of summonses. In keeping with the power to issue arrest warrants 
under the Criminal Code of Canada, where the purposes of the Act can be fulfilled by summons, 
arrest warrants should not be used (s. 507(4)). 
35
 There must be exigent circumstances making it impracticable to lay an information, and 
the peace officer must suspect on reasonable grounds that detention is necessary to prevent a 
“terrorist activity.” Alternatively, a peace officer can arrest, notwithstanding that an information has 
been laid and a summons issued, where the peace officer suspects on reasonable grounds that 
detention is necessary to prevent a “terrorist activity” (subss. 83.3(4)(a) and (b)). 
36
 Subsection 83.3(5). If the peace officer fails to lay an information and the subject is 
brought before a provincial court judge, the judge shall order his release (subs. 83.3(7)(a)). 
37
 Subsection 88.3(7)(b). The legislation therefore contemplates holding a subject for up to 
72 hours. Indeed, the period could be moderately longer than 72 hours if a provincial court judge is 
not available within 24 hours for first appearance, as the 48-hour adjournment can be ordered by 
the judge only after that first appearance occurs. 
38
 Detention can be ordered on the primary ground (to ensure attendance) or tertiary ground 
(to prevent offences) that is ordinarily applicable in “show cause” hearings, or on the general 
ground that “detention is necessary in order to maintain confidence in the administration of justice, 
having regard to all the circumstances, including the apparent strength of the peace officer’s 
grounds under subsection (2), and the gravity of any terrorist activity that may be carried out.”  
39
 R.S.C. 1995, c. C-46, as am. A s. 515 bail hearing applies where an accused “is charged 
with an offence.” Exceptionally, s. 515 bail hearings are available in s. 810 recognizance proceed-
ings, even though the subject is not charged. This is because the s. 810 sections incorporate by 
reference all of the provisions relating to summary conviction offences, mutatis mutandis, including 
s. 795, which in turn makes the provisions of Part XVI of the Code (which contain the bail release 
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find a source for the authority to release on conditions. The net effect could be 
that subjects are either released unconditionally, or held in custody.  
In order to lay an information under section 83.3, the peace officer must: 
(a)  believe on reasonable grounds that a terrorist activity40 will be carried 
out; and 
(b)  suspect on reasonable grounds that the imposition of a recognizance of a 
person, or the arrest of a person, is necessary to prevent the carrying out 
of the terrorist activity. 
After the hearing, the provincial court judge may, “if satisfied by the evi-
dence adduced that the peace officer has reasonable grounds for suspicion,” 
order a recognizance of up to 12 months. Conditions include an undertaking to 
keep the peace and be of good behaviour, as well as any reasonable conditions 
that the provincial court judge considers desirable for preventing the carrying-
out of a terrorist activity. If the subject fails or refuses to enter the recogni-
zance, he can be imprisoned for up to 12 months.41 If he enters the recognizance 
and breaches it, he will have committed an offence contrary to section 811 of 
the Criminal Code,42 a hybrid offence providing for up to two years’ incarcera-
tion. 
2. Understanding and Respecting the Impact of Section 83.3 
The utility of section 83.3 has been questioned by some because of the intui-
tively preposterous underlying assumption that conditions of release can some-
how affect the resolve of terrorists to commit terrorist acts.43 Professor Trotter 
                                                                                                                                                              
provisions) applicable to Part XXVII of the Code (dealing with summary conviction offences, 
including s. 810 proceedings): R. v. Cachine (2001), 154 C.C.C. (3d) 376 (B.C.C.A.). Section 83.3 
has no mutatis mutandis reference, and is not in Part XVI of the Code. It is in Part II, dealing with 
offences against public order. The reasoning used in Cachine and other cases to make s. 515 
hearings available for s. 810 arrests cannot therefore be used for s. 83.3 arrests.  
40
 This provision uses the term “terrorist activity” even though one might have expected ref-
erence to “terrorist offence,” another term used in the Act. Professor Trotter infers, probably with 
good reason, that this choice was made because Parliament gives “terrorist activity” a broader 
compass than “terrorist offence,” as the definition of “terrorist offence” includes but is not restrict-
ed to indictable offences “where the act or omission constituting the offence also constitutes a 
terrorist activity” (s. 2): Trotter, “The Anti-Terrorism Bill and Preventative Restraints on Liberty” 
in Daniels et al. (eds.), The Security of Freedom: Essays on Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Bill (2001), 
at 242.  
41
 Subsection 83.3(9). 
42
  R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, as am. 
43
 See, for example, Schaeffer, “Effectiveness of Anti-Terrorism Legislation: Does Bill C-36 
Give Us What We Need?” in Daniels et al. (eds.), The Security of Freedom: Essays on Canada’s 
Anti-Terrorism Bill (2001), at 200. 
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coined the engaging phrase, a “peace bond for terrorists,” to signal the likely 
futility of expecting terrorists to abide by court orders.44  
While it is true that terrorists will not be intimidated from engaging in terror-
ist activities by the penalties associated with breaching recognizance terms, it 
would be wrong to judge the constitutional validity of these provisions on the 
supposition that they are pointless. As Trotter also points out, the heading 
“recognizance with conditions” is something of a “Trojan horse.”45 The section 
provides not only for release on conditions, but, as described above, detention 
of up to 72 hours. That detention is not looked at solely as a means of facilitat-
ing the recognizance hearing, but is treated, in its own right, as a method of 
preventing offences.  
Even with respect to the imposition of recognizance conditions, Parliament 
was not so guileless as to believe that imposing conditions will really deter 
terrorist activity by intimidating terrorists. Recognizance conditions can serve 
two more realistic purposes. First, they provide a mechanism for disrupting and 
delaying terrorist activity by demonstrating that the heat is on. Second, and, 
more importantly, they serve as a prelude to longer-term detention. Anyone 
who is placed under a section 83.3 recognizance will invariably be subjected to 
intense surveillance, and, if a breach is detected, arrest will occur and efforts 
will be made to obtain interim as well as punitive detention. 
It is therefore more realistic in assessing the implications of this provision 
from the point of view of Charter compliance to look at it not as an ineffective 
compromise, but rather as a scheme that contemplates detaining persons who 
have not committed offences, not only in the short term, but in the long term as 
well. This better highlights both its potential as a law enforcement tool, and its 
full and sobering implications for civil liberties, factors that must be appreci-
ated if the section is to be given fair constitutional treatment. 
3. The Constitutional Validity of Section 83.3 
(a) Detaining, and Imposing Conditions on, Persons Who Have Not Commit-
ted Offences 
On its face, this regime appears aberrant, a departure from basic criminal law 
principles. Permitting arrest, detention and the deprivation of liberty by placing 
persons under conditions of release prior to events even maturing to the point 
where an inchoate offence has occurred, violates the principle of an “act,” one 
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  “The Anti-Terrorism Bill and the Preventative Restraints on Liberty” in Daniels et al. 
(eds.), The Security of Freedom: Essays on Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Bill (2001), at 241. 
45
 Id., at 242. 
202  Supreme Court Law Review (2002), 16 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
of the “two traditional pillars of substantive criminal law.”46 It also challenges 
the presumption of innocence by predicting the criminality of the subject before 
criminality even occurs. Unfortunately, those of us who see the section in this 
way are apt to be disappointed for two reasons.  
(i)  This Section Is Not a Departure from Past Practice 
First, this provision is not as aberrant as some might think. Preventative ar-
rest and detention is not unknown to our law. Indeed, we are becoming fright-
eningly comfortable with it. Subsection 495(1)(a) of the Criminal Code has 
long authorized peace officers to arrest without warrant persons whom they 
believe, on reasonable grounds, to be about to commit an indictable offence, 
and the common law permitted arrests to prevent apprehended breaches of the 
peace.47 Moreover, there are a number of provisions related to section 810 of 
the Criminal Code (I will call them the section 810 offences) that permit re-
straints on liberty in the form of recognizance orders48 in order to forestall 
anticipated, even non-imminent, criminal conduct. These include the original 
provision, section 810 itself (fear on reasonable grounds that a person will 
cause personal injury or damage to property),49 section 810.01 (fear on reason-
able grounds that a person will commit a criminal organization offence),50 
section 810.1 (fear on reasonable grounds that a person will commit a sexual 
offence against a child),51 and section 810.252 (fear on reasonable grounds that a 
person will commit a serious personal injury offence).53 Persons who are the 
subject of section 810 complaints can be arrested and even detained pending 
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 Stuart, Canadian Criminal Law (4th ed., 2001), at 80. A challenge based on the principle 
of an act failed with respect to s. 810 in R. v. Baker, [1999] B.C.J. No. 681 (B.C.C.A.), online: QL 
(B.C.J.) for the reasons described below. 
47
 This power is discussed in Brown v. Durham Regional Police Force (1998), 21 C.R. (5th) 
1 (Ont. C.A.). 
48
 The imposition of restrictions on movement or conduct is a restraint on liberty, within the 
meaning of s. 7: R. v Heywood, supra, note 3. 
49
  Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, as am. 
50
  Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, as am. 
51
  Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, as am. 
52
  Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, as am. 
53
 The original s. 810 differs in nature and function from the subsequently enacted s. 810 
processes. Original s. 810 was intended to provide comfort to a particular person, who was in fear 
of another. It was a statutory provision formalizing a common law power courts had long claimed, 
and it was as close to a private remedy as the criminal law provided for. The successor provisions 
are intended not to provide comfort at the behest of a particular person who is living in fear, but 
rather to target potential offenders and make it harder for them to offend. The language of “fear” is 
borrowed and inserted into these provisions, but it is not at all their focus. General crime prevention 
is.  
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their hearing, as both the powers of arrest by warrant under section 507(4) of 
the Criminal Code and the bail review provisions of the Criminal Code54 have 
been held to apply to the section 810 proceedings. 
The existence of pre-existing powers similar to section 83.3 does not, of 
course, assure the constitutional validity of section 83.3, but it does mean that 
the ground ploughed by section 83.3 has already been broken by the section 
810 sections and is thereby more fertile for compromising constitutional values 
than might otherwise have been the case. The climate in which any constitu-
tional challenge to section 83.3 will be undertaken is not as commodious, there-
fore, as might be believed. When considering section 83.3 challenges, courts 
will not be faced with some unheard-of arrogation of state power that will have 
to be justified as an exceptional measure in a time of crisis. They will be faced 
with a familiar arrogation of state power. As Professor Friedland remarked, “it 
is not a great stretch to carry the techniques over to fear of a terrorist offence.”55  
(ii)  That There Is No Offence Actually Helps Preserve Constitutional Validity 
The second thing that will disappoint those of us who are instinctively of-
fended by a provision that undermines what are thought to be fundamental 
precepts of the system, is that we tend to provide less Charter protection to 
preventative restraints on liberty than we do in the case of punitive restraints on 
liberty. Section 810 provisions have been upheld in a fashion that will go a long 
way to preserving section 83.3. So too, has the use of pre-trial detention. 
In general terms, in R. v. Budreo the Ontario Court of Appeal accepted that: 
The criminal justice system has two broad objectives: punish wrongdoers and 
prevent future harm. A law aimed at the prevention of crime is just as valid an ex-
ercise of the federal criminal law power under s. 91(27) of the Constitution Act, 
1867, as a law aimed at punishing crime.56 
This observation does more than to simply dispense with any phantom “divi-
sion of powers” argument that might be made. It gives clear imprimatur to the 
preventative use of the criminal law power. It was in this welcoming context 
that the Ontario Court of Appeal accepted a submission that could put an inglo-
rious end to the application of the most obvious principles of fundamental 
justice in pre-charge recognizance cases. Speaking of the section permitting 
recognizance orders against pedophiles, the Court held, “[Section] 810.1 does 
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 See R. v. Cachine, supra, note 39; R. v. Budreo, supra, note 33; and R. v. Wakelin (1991), 
71 C.C.C. (3d) 115 (Sask. C.A.). This interpretation has survived Charter scrutiny. 
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 “Police Powers in Bill C-36” in Daniels et al. (eds.), The Security of Freedom: Essays on 
Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Bill (2001), at 279.  
56
 Supra, note 33, at 138. 
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not create an offence. It is a preventative provision not a punitive provision.”57 
It therefore need not conform to the same norms that offences must, such as the 
presumption of innocence in its full flower, or the requirement of an act. 
Budreo is not an isolated case in using the reason for the restraint on liberty 
as a basis for diminishing Charter protection. Consider the bail release provi-
sions of the Criminal Code. Those provisions permit detention, prior to an 
adjudication of guilt, in order to prevent the person arrested from committing 
further offences.58 They also permit the imposition of recognizance conditions. In 
R. v. Pearson the Supreme Court of Canada held that these powers do not violate 
the presumption of innocence in spite of this. It explained that, while the pre-
sumption of innocence supports the principle under section 7 that “the starting 
point for any proposed deprivation of . . . liberty . . . of the person of anyone 
charged with or suspected of an offence must be that the person is innocent,”59 this 
principle has a different, less intense meaning where the “process does not involve 
a determination of guilt.”60 The presumption of innocence is not offended, there-
fore, by pre-conviction detention, nor is the Crown required by the Charter to 
prove an offence beyond a reasonable doubt to obtain pre-trial detention.  
The distinction between preventative and punitive detention as a means to 
give lesser Charter protection in the case of preventative detention is unsettling 
for at least three reasons. First, as a matter of substance, pre-conviction or even 
pre-offence deprivations of liberty are as intrusive as post-conviction depriva-
tions of liberty. Second, using this approach gives greater constitutional protec-
tion to those who are alleged to have caused harm than to those who are not. 
This is intuitively troubling. Third, the distinction between “preventative” and 
“punitive” deprivations of liberty is capable of being used instrumentally. In R. 
v. Lyons, long-term detention under the dangerous offender provisions was 
challenged as contrary to section 7 of the Charter on the basis that the detention 
was preventative and not punitive, enabling accused persons to be detained 
because of fear or suspicion relating to their criminal proclivities. Contrary to 
the view expressed in Budreo, the Supreme Court of Canada suggested that if 
this were so, there would indeed be a violation of section 7. It upheld the dan-
gerous offender provisions of the Criminal Code, in part because they were 
punitive and not preventative.61  
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 R. v. Pearson, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 665, at 683. 
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(2002), 16 S.C.L.R. (2d) Constitutional Casualties of September 11 205 
 
It is possible to craft intelligent arguments against section 83.3, relying on 
the authority of Lyons. What emerges from all of this, however, is the prag-
matic and legal reality that Charter adjudication is invariably influenced by 
context, and even implication. Had the Court in Pearson accepted, for example, 
that any detention without conviction violates the Charter, long-standing and 
necessary powers of pre-trial detention would have been imperilled. The Court 
therefore accepted that context and purpose will have an impact on the meaning 
and role given to fundamental principles. The reality is that courts will reserve 
the right to apply principles in a flexible, contextual manner so that they do not 
unsettle important and “reasonable” initiatives. This undermines certainty and 
predictability and permits subjective decision making. While this kind of in-
strumental reasoning makes it hard to predict outcomes, one thing it does make  
crystal-clear is that the generic claim that pre-conviction detention or pre-
conviction recognizance is per se unconstitutional is untenable. It can be ex-
pected that courts will balance competing considerations to determine whether 
the choices that have been made are “reasonable” ones.62  
It is to be hoped that in undertaking this assessment, courts will be influ-
enced by the fact that pre-offence detention and pre-offence recognizance 
conditions do have the same impact on liberty as when those methods are used 
punitively, and it is to be hoped that courts will bear in mind the excruciatingly 
serious stigma that would befall anyone subjected to a section 83.3 order. Three 
things, more than any others, will probably make the use of pre-offence deten-
tion attractive in spite of all of this. First, the period of detention is tightly 
circumscribed, unlike denying bail release, which can result in months of pre-
trial detention. Second, the outcomes in the section are discretionary. The deci-
sions of peace officers to arrest are subject to review within the same reason-
able delay that is used for bail hearings, and the judge has authority to either 
deny the request for an order or to tailor conditions to the needs of the case. 
Courts are apt to see the section as allowing for tailored denials of liberty, and 
not overly broad or arbitrary deprivations of liberty. Third, the function that this 
process serves is apt to commend itself to courts. The powers in section 83.3 
will be judged according to whether they are useful and rational measures for 
societal protection, and a great deal of deference will be given to Parliament in 
this regard.  
                                                                                                                                                              
analogous to a “lesser included offence on a dangerous offender application”: R. v. Turley (1999), 
136 C.C.C. (3d) 426, at 433 (B.C.C.A.). 
62
 In R. v. Budreo, supra, note 33, the issue came down to a “reasonableness” inquiry, under 
the auspices of the overbreadth doctrine. The Court found the choices made by Parliament to have 
been reasonable ones. 
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There is more than a little irony in all of this; the “preventative/punitive” dis-
tinction sends the message to the government that if it strikes before an offence 
occurs, it need worry less about the Charter. Still, a challenge premised on the 
simple fact of pre-offence or pre-act restraints on liberty will run directly into 
pragmatic resistance, our traditions in bail release settings, our growing affinity 
to using restraint to prevent offences such as in section 810, and the technical 
assistance provided by the authority in R. v. Budreo.63 This may be too impos-
ing an array of obstacles to overcome. 
(b) The Standards for Detention 
While the general use of pre-offence detention and recognizance orders is 
not apt to violate the Charter per se, the treatment in section 83.3 of standards 
for arrest and detention could. Those standards are lower than one might ex-
pect. Indeed, the standard for detaining someone under this provision is lower 
than the usual standard for issuing a search warrant.64  
(i)  Arrest and Detention by the Peace Officer 
With good reason, Trotter calls the treatment of standards in section 83.3 
“beguiling.”65 In order to lay an information, a peace officer must turn her mind 
to two criteria, the first relating to whether a terrorist activity will be carried 
out, and the second relating to the involvement of the subject. Inexplicably, the 
standard of belief that will satisfy the second of these criteria is lower than the 
standard needed to meet the first. In particular, with respect to the vaguer and 
more easily satisfied criterion of whether a terrorist activity will be carried out, 
the peace officer must believe that this will occur “on reasonable grounds.” 
This is the same standard used in the section 810 recognizance provisions, and 
requires an objectively valid belief that a terrorist activity will probably occur.66 




 But see R. v. Golub (1997), 117 C.C.C. (3d) 193, at 202 (Ont. C.A), leave to appeal denied 
(1998), 128 C.C.C. (3d) vi (S.C.C.), which takes some of the sting out of this observation. Justice 
Doherty was not speaking of legislated standards, but rather their application, but he did say that 
less demanding standards of reasonable grounds have to be applied in cases of warrantless arrests 
than in assessing judicial decisions to grant search warrants, because of the volatile and rapidly 
changing conditions in which warrantless arrests occur. 
65
  “The Anti-Terrorism Bill and Preventative Restraint on Liberty,” in Daniels et al. (eds.), 
The Security of Freedom: Essays on Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Bill (2001), at 242. 
66
 See Hunter v. Southam Inc. (1984), 14 C.C.C. (3d) 97, at 114-15 (S.C.C.), interpreting 
“reasonable ground to believe” in a search provision as requiring “reasonable and probable 
grounds,” and see R. v. Storrey (1990), 75 C.R. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.), and R. v. Golub, supra, note 64, 
where the courts treated implicitly the deletion of the term “and probable” from “reasonable and 
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As for the second criteria, relating to the involvement of the subject, it is 
enough if the peace officer “suspects on reasonable grounds” that the subject is 
involved, and that detention or the imposition of conditions is needed to prevent 
the carrying-out of the terrorist activity. Reasonable suspicion is a lower stan-
dard than “reasonable grounds to believe.”67 One can reasonably suspect some-
thing long before one comes close to reasonably believing it.  
It is more than a little troubling that, under section 83.3, less certitude is 
needed with respect to the participation of the subject who will be detained than 
with respect to the general existence of a terrorist threat. It is this lower stan-
dard that will attract Charter attention. No other arrest provision in the Criminal 
Code turns on so low a standard.68 Even the ability to arrest under subsection 
495(1)(a) in order to prevent an imminent indictable offence requires reason-
able grounds. This means that a man who is only reasonably suspected of being 
about to murder his wife cannot be arrested, but if subsection 83.3 survives, a 
man who is reasonably suspected of planning to make a donation to a listed 
organization at some indeterminate point can be.  
Juxtaposing implications in this way can give a general flavour of whether 
the provision strikes one as reasonable, but it does not answer the constitutional 
question. Approaching the matter more technically, then, what does Charter 
jurisprudence tell us?  
(A)  Section 11(d) Is Not Offended Directly But Section 7 Could Be 
Where a person is charged with an offence, section 11(d) of the Charter does 
not permit punitive detention without proof beyond a reasonable doubt, but, as 
indicated, section 83.3 does not provide for punitive detention and it does not 
charge persons with offences. Section 11(d) and the standard of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt does not therefore apply. In R. v. Pearson the Court did hold, 
however, that section 7 of the Charter supplements this provision to enable the 
                                                                                                                                                              
probable grounds” dealing with s. 495 powers of arrest, as an inconsequential amendment. In R. v. 
Debot (1986), 30 C.C.C. (3d) 207, at 219 (Ont. C.A.), Martin J.A. described the standard of “rea-
sonable grounds to believe” as “one of reasonable probability.” This passage was specifically 
approved in the Supreme Court of Canada, (1989), 52 C.C.C. (3d) 193, at 213. 
67
 In Hunter v. Southam Inc., id., at 114-15, Dickson J. defined “reasonable grounds to be-
lieve” by noting that where reasonable grounds to believe exist, “credibly-based probability replac-
es suspicion.” In R. v. Lindsay, dealing with the “reasonably suspects” standard used for roadside 
detentions, the Ontario Court of Appeal suggested that reasonable suspicion does not require 
definition and means what it says, and that it does not require “belief”: (1999), 134 C.C.C. (3d) 
159, at 160 (Ont. C.A.). 
68
 On the other hand, the Official Secrets Act, supra, note 13, has permitted arrest based on 
reasonable suspicion since its enactment in 1911. The provision has not been challenged under the 
Charter. 
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presumption of innocence to operate in non-trial contexts; this general principle 
provides the “starting point” that anyone who is about to face the loss of liberty 
is presumed innocent.69 As indicated, the intensity of that principle will vary 
according to context. Interestingly, in citing examples of cases where the pre-
sumption of innocence does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt, in-
cluding bail release, searches and seizure, and detentions, Lamer C.J. noted: 
“Each of these specific examples is consistent with the view that certain depri-
vations of liberty and security of the person may be in accordance with the 
principles of fundamental justice where there are reasonable grounds for doing 
so.”70 
To be more precise, each of the examples requires reasonable grounds to be-
lieve, or in the case of bail, even proof on the balance of probabilities.71 Subject 
to the unpredictable, context-based tampering that can occur under section 7, 
this provides authority for the proposition that the meager “reasonable grounds 
to suspect” standard in section 83.3 violates section 7. 
(B)  Section 9 Might be Offended 
Section 9, dealing with arbitrary detention, could also be used to challenge 
the standard of proof. The typical or familiar standard for a non-arbitrary deten-
tion requires only that there be “articulable cause” for a detention, a constella-
tion of discernable factors that are related to the purpose of the detention.72 If 
this is the standard applied to section 83.3, it will be satisfied because the re-
quirement of reasonable suspicion, when met, will provide “articulable cause.” 
Cases using the “articulable cause” test, however, involve extremely non-
intrusive or short-term detention, such as a stop related to the enforcement of 
the rules of the road,73 or customs stops,74 or the transient stop of a suspicious 
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 Supra, note 59, at 683. 
70
 Id., at 684. 
71
 R. v. Julian (1972), 20 C.R.N.S. 227 (N.S.T.D.), and see Trotter, The Law of Bail in Can-
ada (1999), at 204. 
72
 See R. v. Hufsky (1988), 63 C.R. (3d) 14, at 23 (S.C.C.), where it was said that “the ran-
dom stop for the purposes of the spot check procedure . . . resulted . . . in an arbitrary detention, 
because there were no criteria for the selection of the drivers to be stopped and subjected to the spot 
check procedure.” The phrase “articulable cause” is now employed to describe the existence of 
criteria related to the purpose for the stop. See Brown v. Durham Regional Police Force, supra, 
note 47, at 19-20. 
73
 See R. v. Hufsky, id., and Brown v. Durham Regional Police Force, id. 
74
 See R. v. Jacques (1996), 1 C.R. (5th) 229 (S.C.C.), involving the stop of a motor vehicle 
suspected of crossing, at a non-controlled border crossing. 
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person for investigative purposes,75 not arrests and detention for hours on end. 
There is good reason to believe that more than “articulable cause” is required to 
justify detentions amounting to full-scale arrest.  
In R. v. Storrey76 the Supreme Court of Canada overturned the decision of a 
trial judge, who had considered the arrest of Mr. Storrey to be arbitrary, in 
violation of section 9 of the Charter. The trial judge had found a section 9 
violation because he believed that the officers did not have reasonable and 
probable grounds to arrest Mr. Storrey. The Supreme Court of Canada dis-
agreed, finding there were, in fact, reasonable and probable grounds for the 
arrest. The Court did not, therefore, have to address overtly the question of 
whether an arrest short of reasonable and probable grounds is “arbitrary” within 
the meaning of section 9. Justice Cory did say, however: 
There is an additional safeguard against arbitrary arrest. It is not sufficient for the 
police officer to personally believe that he or she has reasonable and probable 
grounds to make an arrest. Rather, it must be objectively established that those rea-
sonable and probable grounds did in fact exist.77 [Emphasis added.] 
While not an overt proclamation that the standard for non-arbitrary arrest is 
the existence of reasonable and probable grounds, the passage does provide 
some support for that proposition. 
Support for the view that an arrest without reasonable and probable grounds 
is “arbitrary,” particularly when it involves arrests related to apprehended as 
opposed to consummated crimes, can also be found in the common law. In 
Brown v. Durham Regional Police Force,78 Doherty J. was asked to accept the 
submission that at common law, the police had the power to arrest or detain 
persons in order to preserve the peace, based solely on the belief that they are 
persons who are generally engaged in criminal conduct. That submission was 
rejected because the common law authority to arrest at common law was more 
limited than that: 
Two features of the common law power to arrest or detain to prevent an 
apprehended breach of the peace merit emphasis. The apprehended breach must be 
imminent and the risk that the breach will occur must be substantial. The mere 
possibility of some unspecified breach at some unknown point in time will not 
suffice. . . . To properly invoke [this] power, the police must have reasonable 
                                                                                                                                                              
75
 See R. v. Johnson (2000), 32 C.R. (5th) 236, at 238 (B.C.C.A.). A brief detention to ques-
tion the suspect based on reasonable suspicion was not arbitrary. 
76
 Supra, note 66. 
77
 Id., at 8-9. 
78
 Supra, note 47. 
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grounds for believing that the anticipated conduct . . . will likely occur if the person 
is not detained.79 
Although Doherty J. was not, at this point in the judgment, expressing a view 
on whether a less restricted power of arrest for apprehended harm would be 
arbitrary contrary to section 9, the fact that the common law imposed these 
requirements is useful data that would support a constitutional challenge to the 
standards embodied in section 83.3. 
Again, the sliding nature of constitutional protection according to context 
could undermine the claim that section 9 is prima facie offended by the reason-
able suspicion standard. In R. v. Jacques the fact that the traffic stop and search 
that took place was related to customs control and not simply to the enforce-
ment of driving regulations gave comfort to the Court in denying the applica-
tion of sections 8 and 9 of the Charter.80 The high state interest in controlling its 
borders supported a greater range of “reasonable” or “non-arbitrary” conduct 
than would be acceptable in other contexts.  
The use of variable standards for constitutional scrutiny is in keeping with 
the approach taken to the presumption of innocence in R. v. Pearson.81 It is also 
the approach taken in Hunter v. Southam Inc. with respect to search and sei-
zure.82 As the Supreme Court of Canada said in R. v. McKinlay Transport Ltd., 
“[t]he standard of review of what is ‘reasonable’ in a given context must be 
flexible if it is to be realistic and meaningful.”83 Indeed, speaking specifically of 
state security, Dickson J. said: “Where the State’s interest is not simply law 
enforcement as, for instance, where State security is involved . . . the relevant 
standard [required by the Charter] might well be a different one [than the usual 
warrant requirement of reasonable and probable grounds].”84 
This, of course, is what the government is counting on generally with respect 
to the anti-terrorism legislation, and specifically, in this context. They will urge 
that even if reasonable and probable grounds for arrest are normally required to 
avoid a section 9 violation, that standard is not required by the Charter where a 
preventative arrest power is intended to forestall monstrous tragedies such as 
occurred on September 11, whether in Canada or elsewhere.85  
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 Id., at 26. 
80
 Supra, note 74, at 238, and the cases cited therein. 
81
 Supra, note 59. 
82
 Supra, note 66, at 115. 
83
 [1990] 1 S.C.R. 627, at 645. 
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 Hunter v. Southam Inc., supra, note 66, at 115. 
85
 Consideration of context in this way permits the double counting of those contextual fac-
tors that militate against liberty, once in determining whether there is a prima facie violation and 
again, if it gets that far, in deciding whether there is a s. 1 justification. 
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As noted, context-driven determinations defy prediction. It will ultimately be 
a matter of choice. For his part, Professor Friedland noted: “Is a lower standard 
of proof acceptable to arrest a person who is suspected of being about to com-
mit a terrorist offence? That depends on the threat. My own view is that it is 
clearly acceptable for terrorist offences under a restricted definition of terror-
ism.”86 
Others, myself included, disagree. It is not as if requiring reasonable and 
probable grounds before denying liberty will disable the police from maintain-
ing vigilant surveillance on subjects. All it will do is prevent a serious erosion 
in criminal law standards.  
(ii)  Judicial Decisions to Extend Detention 
There are a number of problems relating to the judicial power to extend de-
tention for up to 48 hours.  
(A)  Detaining to Preserve Confidence in the Administration of Justice 
First, there is a possible challenge to the legitimacy of judges denying re-
lease to subjects who pose no flight risk, or no threat to the public safety or to 
any witness. This power, housed in subsection 83.3(7)(b)(C),87 permits deten-
tion to be ordered for “any other just cause . . . [including] in order to maintain 
confidence in the administration of justice.” In making the determination of 
whether detention can be justified on this ground under subsection 
83.3(7)(b)(C), the provincial court judge is to have regard to all circumstances, 
“including the apparent strength of the peace officer’s grounds under subsec-
tion (2), and the gravity of any terrorist activity that may be carried out.”  
A similar broad ground for detention was added to section 515(10)(c),88 the 
general bail provision, in response to the striking of the “public interest” be-
cause of its vagueness in R. v. Morales.89 This innovation has itself been chal-
lenged unsuccessfully in the Ontario Court of Appeal, and is currently before 
the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Hall.90 The outcome of Hall may well 
determine the fate of subsection 83.3(7)(b)(C).91  
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 Friedland, “Police Powers in Bill C-36” in Daniels et al. (eds.), The Security of Freedom: 
Essays on Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Bill (2001), at 279.  
87
  Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, as am. 
88
  [Criminal Code; en. 1997, c. 18, s. 59]. 
89
 (1992), 17 C.R. (4th) 74 (S.C.C.). 
90
 (2000), 35 C.R. (5th) 201, leave to appeal granted (2001), 151 C.C.C. (3d) vi (S.C.C.).  
91
 [Criminal Code; en. 2001, c. 41, s. 4]. For my part, I do not think that the problem is so 
much one of vagueness. I think it is arbitrary, contrary to s. 9, and contrary to the presumption of 
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(B)  No Interim Release on Conditions 
There is another problem relating to the judicial detention power. Where the 
ordinary bail provisions of section 515 apply, a step-ladder approach is used 
that enables the release of the accused where the interests that would otherwise 
be protected by detention can be served, short of detention, by the imposition of 
conditions of release. Strangely, as described above, there is no power to re-
lease on conditions pending an adjourned section 83.3 hearing. This gap harms 
the liberty interests of those who are subjected to requests for further detention. 
If a court considering a detention request was to conclude that a person cannot 
be released without conditions, but could be released safely with conditions, 
that court, having no power to impose interim release conditions, would have to 
keep that person in custody pointlessly.92 This makes the scheme vulnerable to 
successful Charter challenge because the state has no legitimate interest in 
keeping someone in custody who can be released safely on conditions. The 
detention is arbitrary, and in my view, altogether apart from section 9, violates 
the principle of fundamental justice, protected by section 7, that was recognized 
in Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General): “Where the deprivation 
of [liberty] does little or nothing to enhance the state’s interest (whatever it may 
be), . . . a breach of fundamental justice will be made out, as the individual’s 
rights will have been deprived for no valid purpose.”93 
(c) Judicial Recognizance Standards May Also Be Too Low 
When it comes to the power of judges to impose conditions of recognizance, 
the standard is also lower than we are accustomed to, even with respect to the 
section 810 provisions. Each of the section 810 provisions requires “evidence 
adduced that the informant has reasonable grounds” before recognizance condi-
tions can be imposed. By contrast, for the imposition of conditions under sub-
section 83.3(8)(a),94 the judge must merely be satisfied that “the peace officer 
has reasonable grounds for the suspicion.”95  
                                                                                                                                                              
innocence founded in the principles of fundamental justice under s. 7, to detain a person who poses 
no threat of flight or harm, essentially because the public thinks he should be locked up before trial. 
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 A possible solution would be for the judge to deny the adjournment, regardless of how 
meritorious it would otherwise be. This could prejudice the ability of the Crown to prove a merito-
rious case by forcing the Crown on before it is ready. The section should either be struck down and 
recrafted to solve this problem, or the Charter should be used to read in the interim release process 
provided for in s. 515 of the Criminal Code. 
93
 (1993), 24 C.R. (4th) 281, at 301 (S.C.C.). 
94
  [Criminal Code; en. 2001, c. 41, s. 4]. 
95
 As a preliminary point, the subsection is not clear on exactly what the judge is to attend to 
in making that decision, the peace officer’s state of mind relating to a terrorist activity, or the peace 
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This provides a remarkably low standard for ordering a recognizance. In 
subsection 507(4) (issuance of a warrant for arrest), subsection 515(10) (interim 
detention at a bail hearing), and section 487.0196 (the general warrant provi-
sion), the issue is whether the judge who is considering making the order is 
herself satisfied on the evidence that there are “reasonable grounds to believe.” 
The section 83.3(8)(a) standard is lower than that used in these sections in two 
respects. First, under subsection 83.3(8)(a) the judge need merely be satisfied 
that there are reasonable grounds to suspect; there is no need for reasonable 
grounds to believe. Second, the inquiry is an attenuated one; the judge is not to 
inquire into her own opinion about whether there are reasonable grounds to 
suspect but much in the fashion of a judicial review, subsection 83.3(8)(a) asks 
the judge’s opinion on whether the peace officer had reasonable grounds to 
suspect.97 When combined with the ordinary standard of proof applicable in 
such cases, the balance of probabilities,98 what the judge is really being asked to 
decide, then, is whether the peace officer probably had reasonable grounds for 
his suspicion.99 It is on this minimal and attenuated inquiry that liberty of indi-
viduals is deprived through the imposition of conditions. 
Again, it is difficult to say whether this contravenes the Charter. The ulti-
mate question will be the entirely speculative and value-laden one of whether 
the supposed benefits of this scheme justify the detrimental impact it will have 
on the liberty interests of potentially innocent persons. For my part, I say no. 
                                                                                                                                                              
officer’s state of mind relating to the need to impose conditions on the subject. The use of the term 
“reasonable grounds for the suspicion” could suggest that the judge need attend only to the latter, 
since the reference to “the suspicion” is not apt to describe the state of mind contemplated in subs. 
83.3(4) relating to the apprehension that a terrorist activity will be carried out. On that matter the 
officer must have more than suspicion; she must have reasonable and probable grounds to believe. 
Notwithstanding this hurried drafting, common sense would suggest that the provincial court judge 
must consider both of the prerequisites to swearing an information. 
96
 [Criminal Code; en. 1993, c. 40, s. 15; am. 1997, c. 18, s. 42, 1997, c. 23, s. 13]. 
97
 I doubt this was some nefarious choice. The wording is modeled on the 810 sections, 
which also focus on the complainant’s state of mind. As described in footnote 48, supra, looking at 
whether the fear of the complainant is reasonable makes sense for s. 810 itself, because a s. 810 
restraining order is intended to ameliorate that complainant’s fear by keeping the respondent away. 
It makes no sense to look at the fear of the complainant, as opposed to whether there are grounds 
for concluding that the respondent does pose a general danger, under ss. 810.01, 810.1 and 810.2. 
Unfortunately, those provisions pointlessly mimick the s. 810 model. 
98
 See R. v. Giardino, [1997] O.J. No. 1073 (Gen. Div.), online: QL (O.J.), relating to s. 810. 
99
 In a case where not all of the evidence that the police officer was privy to is shown to the 
judge, it is at least hypothetically possible for a judge to make a finding that the peace officer had 
reasonable suspicion, even if the judge herself would not be able to conclude on the evidence 
presented that she, too, would have reasonable suspicion. 
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(d) The Section 810.01 Amendment 
As described above, section 810.01 of the Criminal Code of Canada is 
amended by the Anti-Terrorism Act to include any terrorism offence. This 
amendment means that any person who fears that another may commit a terror-
ism offence, can, with the consent of the Attorney General, apply for a recogni-
zance order. This essentially duplicates section 83.3, save for three important 
distinctions.  
First, the standard for applying requires that the fear be based on reasonable 
grounds rather than reasonable suspicion.100 Second, the section 515 bail provi-
sions apply to section 810.01 applications,101 and section 515 does not permit 
48-hour adjournments. In truth this provides cold comfort to the accused be-
cause under the section 515 regime, the subject can be held until the hearing, 
which can be scheduled at any point within a reasonable time. This will almost 
invariably be longer than the 48 hours imposed by section 83.3. Third, section 
810.01 does not contain a sunset clause. In five years, regardless of what hap-
pens to section 83.3, section 801.01 will continue in force. For these reasons, it 
may be that the defence bar should be more concerned about this incidental 
amendment to section 810.01 than about section 83.3.  
IV.  INVESTIGATIVE HEARINGS 
1.  The Statutory Provisions 
(a) The General Scheme 
Section 83.28 enables a peace officer, with the prior consent of the Attorney 
General, to apply ex parte to a provincial or superior court judge for an order 
for “the gathering of information.”102 “Gathering of information” involves the 
compelled testimony and production of relevant documents and items before a 
judge, under pain of potential incarceration for refusing to attend,103 threat of 
contempt of court for refusing to answer, or the risk of criminal conviction and 
punishment for providing false testimony. This kind of order can be used both 
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 The fact that a reasonable and probable grounds standard was deemed sufficient by the 
government for the purposes of s. 810.01 will aid in demonstrating that the reasonable suspicion 
standard in s. 83.3 is too low. On the other hand, it also means that should the power of judges to 
make s. 83.3 recognizance orders be struck down, the government could simply employ s. 810.01 in 
its stead.  
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 See the text accompanying note 54. 
102
 [Criminal Code; en. 2001, c. 41, s. 4]. 
103
 Section 83.29 provides for a special warrant for the arrest and potential detention of any-
one who is evading service, absconding or failing to attend or remain in attendance. 
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as a strategy for obtaining information to forestall anticipated attacks and as an 
investigative technique to help solve criminal investigations relating to offences 
already believed to have occurred.  
To make an order for “gathering of information” in order to assist peace offi-
cers in preventing an anticipated terrorist offence, the judge must be satisfied 
there are reasonable grounds to believe that 
• a terrorism offence will be committed; 
• the person to be questioned has “direct and material information” about 
the offence or the whereabouts of suspects who the officer suspects may 
commit a terrorism offence; and 
• reasonable attempts have already been made to get information from 
that person.104 
To make an order for “gathering of information” to assist peace officers in-
vestigating offences already believed to have occurred, the judge must be satis-
fied there are reasonable grounds to believe that 
• a terrorism offence has been committed, and 
• information concerning the offence or the whereabouts of suspects is 
likely to be obtained as a result of the order.105 
All questions must be answered and all information provided, unless pro-
tected by privilege or “any law relating to non-disclosure of information,”106 
what I will refer to below as “near-privilege.” Subsection 83.28(10) provides, 
however, that 
(a) no answer given or thing produced . . . shall be used or received against that 
person in any criminal proceedings against that person, other than a prose-
cution [for perjury (s. 132) or the giving of contradictory evidence (s.136)]; 
and 
(b)  no evidence derived from the evidence obtained from the person shall be 
used . . . against the person in any criminal proceedings, other than a prose-
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 Subsection 83.28(4)(b). 
105
 Subsection 83.28(4)(a). 
106
 Subsection 83.28(8). The reference to “any law relating to non-disclosure” was added be-
cause there are essentially three kinds of rules that can justify non-disclosure of information from 
compellable witnesses: “class privilege” like solicitor-client privilege, “case-by-case privilege” in 
which information imparted in confidence is tested on an ad hoc basis using the four-part 
“Wigmore test,” and other mechanisms like s. 278.1 of the Criminal Code, which erect processes 
and preconditions that must be met to access confidential information but which are not, strictly 
speaking, privileges. 
216  Supreme Court Law Review (2002), 16 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
cution [for perjury (s. 132) or the giving of contradictory evidence 
(s.136)].107 
(b) Are These Proceedings Open? 
There seems to be no provision in the Anti-Terrorism Act indicating whether 
“investigative questioning” will occur in open court. It is unlikely that, given its 
function, the government would want it to be. While there is a presumption at 
common law that court proceedings will be open,108 it is difficult to predict how 
a court would react to an application to exclude the public. This is not a trial, 
and it was held in Travers v. Canada (Board of Inquiry on the Activities of the 
Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group in Somalia) with respect to a statu-
tory board of inquiry that the proceedings need not be open because the Board 
had no decision-making role. The Court said: “before any ‘right’ of access . . . 
can be asserted it is necessary to ask what it is to which access is sought. Where 
. . . access is sought to an inquiry or investigation it is proper to look to its 
function and  
purpose.”109 
The fact that section 83.28 contemplates the use of judges rather than ap-
pointed commissioners could well distinguish this decision, requiring that 
investigative questioning before a judge take place in open court. 
(c) Do the Rules of Evidence Apply? 
The section is also silent about the application of the rules of evidence. Since 
this is an evidence gathering and not adjudicate function, it seems clear that, 
privilege and near privilege aside, rules of evidence would not apply. 
2.  The Constitutional Validity of the “Investigative Hearing” 
(a)  Overall Assessment 
There are serious constitutional issues raised by section 83.28. To put the 
matter into context, section 83.28 exists in unprecedented disregard of long-
standing traditions that are central to our conception of justice. It is remarkable 
in two respects. First, it is an assault on basic concepts or principles related to 
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self-incrimination. Those principles are not apt to invalidate section 83.28, but 
they will limit its utility. Second, it threatens the integrity of the judicial func-
tion by co-opting judges, who in our tradition are neutral, impartial and inde-
pendent triers of law and fact, as participants in the investigation. It casts 
Canadian judges in an unflattering and ill-suited role, and in a fashion that 
should be found to contravene the Charter.  
(b)  This Power Is Unprecedented 
In an effort to give legitimacy to this provision, defenders of section 83.28’s 
“investigative hearings” argue that the section does nothing unique or unprece-
dented. They refer, for example, to provisions requiring witnesses, including 
suspects, to testify at public inquiries and coroner’s inquests.110 In truth, those 
regimes provide no analogy. We permit compelled testimony by suspects be-
fore inquiries precisely because those inquiries are not investigations into 
criminal conduct.111 
Defenders refer, as well, to statutes like the Competition Act112 and provin-
cial securities legislation where witnesses, including suspects, can be made to 
furnish answers.113 These regimes provide no analogy either. We permit com-
pelled answers before such bodies as part of their regulatory function. In fact, 
when those regulatory powers are used for the purpose of aiding a criminal 
investigation, we find those regulatory powers to have been abused. Statements 
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made in response to statutory powers that are conferred for regulatory purposes 
but used improperly for investigative purposes connected to criminal offences 
are excluded from evidence because self-incrimination principles are contra-
vened.114 Indeed, even where answers are compelled for both a regulatory 
purpose and as part of a criminal investigation, self-incrimination principles are 
contravened.115 
It has been said that section 83.28 is analogous to the statutory power to 
compel testimony at a preliminary inquiry.116 It is not in the least. A preliminary 
inquiry is a judicial hearing before a neutral, impartial adjudicator to determine 
whether the Crown can discharge its evidential burden of proof. The judge is 
not co-opted as an arm of the investigation. She is performing a decidedly 
judicial function. Indeed, it is an abuse of the preliminary inquiry for the Crown 
to attempt to use the preliminary inquiry as an investigative tool.117  
These “precedents” therefore give no support to the philosophy and spirit of 
section 83.28. The lines of jurisprudence they develop actually contradict its 
spirit and philosophy. The “investigative hearing” process in which judges are 
used as part of the investigative arm of the state, and in which compelled testi-
mony is obtained in aid of criminal investigations or even public protection, is 
unprecedented, and we should be clear about that if we are to make an honest 
assessment of the constitutional validity of the provision.  
(c)  Self-Incrimination and the Right to Remain Silent 
(i)  Third Party Witnesses 
When applied to third party witnesses to obtain information about the actions 
of others, section 83.28 does not give rise to self-incrimination questions. As 
the term “self-incrimination” suggests, it arises where individuals are obliged to 
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betray themselves. Although it is an intrusion into the liberty of any person to 
be forced to attend to give witness, there are no principles of law that enable 
persons to resist on this account. Indeed, even though it is contrary to our gen-
eral tradition of not imposing legal obligations on citizens to cooperate with the 
police, it is possible to create offences for failing to do so, even with respect to 
reporting crime.118  
(ii)  Interrogating a Suspect 
When a suspect is being subjected to “investigative hearings,” or where a 
person is forced to disclose his or her own criminality during questioning, 
section 83.28 disrespects basic self-incrimination principles. It is a section that 
overtly contemplates hauling suspects into court and forcing them to speak, on 
pain of punishment, not for a civil purpose or to aid in the operation of a regula-
tory scheme, or to help dispose of a matter before the court, but rather for in-
vestigative purposes relating to crimes they may have committed, or are about 
to commit.119 In some measure the face of this provision is vaguely familiar, 
albeit with a decidedly more civil visage than the last time it was seen in the 
Anglo-Canadian legal tradition — in the accursed Courts of Star Chamber and 
High Commission.120 Without question, the provision contravenes the principle 
against self-incrimination. 
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220  Supreme Court Law Review (2002), 16 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
This does not mean, however, that it violates the Charter. It is not possible to 
be dogmatic on that account because constitutional self-incrimination protec-
tion, like most Charter protection, is unpredictable. As Iacobucci J. has ex-
plained, “the principle against self-incrimination may mean different things at 
different times and in different contexts.”121 To anticipate where the following 
discussion is going, it is my opinion that where subsection 83.28(4)(b) is being 
used to investigate an apprehended attack, the self-incrimination principles in 
the Charter will not be violated, even where a suspect is being questioned. If 
this legislation is used to interrogate suspects about criminal conduct by them 
that has already occurred, however, its use will contravene section 7 of the 
Charter. This will not cause the provision to be struck, but will limit its already 
limited utility.122 
(iii) Contravening Self-Incrimination Principles 
To aid in understanding the impact of this provision on self-incrimination 
principles, it is useful to imagine for a minute that section 83.28 did not involve 
the intercession of a judge.123 Imagine that the provision required citizens to 
attend at a police station when summoned, and threatened them with incarcera-
tion if they did not speak. Without question, this would be perceived as a Sta-
linistic breach of the right to remain silent. It would be greeted by those having 
a sense of history and a commitment to liberty with revulsion and disdain. 
Requiring individuals, on threat of punishment, to respond to state agents who 
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demand information is offensive because it contravenes the principle against 
self-incrimination. That principle, in turn, rests on an amalgam of considera-
tions. First, it reflects a conception of liberty, an idea about the relationship 
between citizen and state, that was forged in our political history, and is now 
expressed in the right to remain silent and in the “principle of a case to 
meet.”124 Second, the principle against self-incrimination exists to respect the 
dignity of individuals. Third, it exists because of pragmatic appreciation that 
compelled information is not always terribly trustworthy. Each of these objec-
tives are compromised in some measure by “investigative hearings.” 
(A)  The Right to Silence and the Principle of a Case to Meet 
Dealing with each of these in turn, the conception of liberty expressed in the 
“principle of a case to meet” is normally thought of as a trial principle, but a 
moment’s reflection illustrates that it has broader links. It is an adjunct to the 
“right to silence” and the “voluntariness” conception at common law, that 
preserves to suspects the right to choose whether to speak to the authorities 
prior to the trial commencing.125 We have long believed that, in a free society, 
citizens are entitled to be left alone by the state until good cause has been 
shown for depriving them of that liberty. This includes being left free of legal 
compulsion to answer the allegations made by authorities prior to trial. It is the 
same basic idea that requires the Crown to bear the burden of proof in a crimi-
nal case, or to “show cause” in an interim release hearing. The suspect is to be 
left alone until a case to meet has been shown, entitled even to refuse to dignify 
an allegation with a response. 
This, of course, is a political ideal, a conception of fairness or justice that not 
everyone shares. It is rejected entirely, for example, in totalitarian or commu-
nist states, and although the Canadian government has a laudable record of 
respecting it, this principle is compromised by section 83.28. A provision that 
compels individuals to be interrogated, on pain of punishment, about their own 
conduct is inconsistent with this notion. This is so whether the compelled testi-
mony occurs in a police station or before a kindly judge. The principle is every 
bit as breached whether the person is held incommunicado at the time or given 
the right to have counsel present who can advise the suspect from time to time 
that he will have to keep on answering. The principle is violated notwithstand-
ing the protection for privileges and near-privileges, and even though the At-
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torney General said the interrogation was acceptable by consenting to the pro-
cedure, and even though five years from now the power might evaporate under 
a sunset clause. While treatment would be worse without these protections, it 
would violate the right to remain silent or the principle of a case to meet no 
more. 
(B)  Respect for the Integrity of the Individual 
What, then, of respect for the integrity of the individual? This, too, is a con-
ception born of history. It had to do with compassion for guilty persons, as well 
as those innocent persons who might be roped into investigations as suspects. 
When guilty persons were brought before the Courts of Star Chamber and High 
Commission, they were put in what history has judged to be the “cruel di-
lemma” of either having to breach their oath to God, or incriminate themselves 
and invite punishment. No person, it was felt, should be forced to be his or her 
own accuser in this fashion.126 As for persons who are innocent, the ignominy 
of having to face and answer wrongful, infamous accusations was seen to con-
travene their dignity.  
Section 83.28 only partially respects these ideals. It avoids the full “cruel di-
lemma” by providing “use immunity,” something that I will suggest below will 
likely save it from constitutional failure on self-incrimination grounds. On the 
other hand, even though persons who are brought before a judge during an 
investigative hearing are not incriminating themselves directly because their 
answers cannot be used against them, the guilty among them are compelled, as 
part of an investigation, to be their own accusers, and innocent suspects are 
subjected to compulsion and infamous allegations. 
(C)  The Pragmatic Consideration 
The pragmatic consideration against compelled self-incrimination, that it 
tends not to produce dependable information, supports the “voluntariness” rule 
at common law127 and the “right to silence.”  
Although the concern of the common law was mainly about persons falsely 
implicating themselves by giving involuntary confessions in the face of pres-
sure,128 compelled testimony by suspects is also offensive because it creates the 
risk that persons compelled to speak will feel they have no choice but to protect 
themselves, and will therefore falsely exculpate themselves, ultimately to their 
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prejudice either by committing further offences such as perjury or by producing 
information that can be used to cross-examine them. This is another, albeit less 
sympathetic, “dilemma” created by compulsion. In R. v. White, for example, the 
Supreme Court of Canada was concerned with whether legislation compelling a 
person to identify herself as the driver of a motor vehicle after an accident 
contravened self-incrimination principles. One of the factors the Court consid-
ered in answering in the affirmative was that there would be a tendency on the 
part of persons to speak falsely in denying their involvement for fear of the 
consequences.129 
It is therefore apparent that section 83.28 violates self-incrimination princi-
ples.130 If it is going to be upheld, it must be with cognizance that the provision 
represents a serious compromise on long-standing values. 
(iv)  The Limited Contribution of the Charter  
The government is counting on subsection 83.28(10) to prevent a finding of 
unconstitutionality. Subsection 83.28(10) provides “use immunity” and “de-
rivative use immunity.” Use immunity operates to compel the witness to an-
swer, but then guarantees that the answers provided will not be used as 
evidence of guilt against that witness if he or she is ever prosecuted. Our law 
has used “use immunity” as a sufficient substitute for granting a privilege to 
refuse to answer self-incriminating questions since 1893. “Derivative use im-
munity,” in turn, prevents evidence found as a result of the compelled testi-
mony from being used to incriminate the witness in a subsequent proceedings. 
For example, if a witness were to disclose the location of a biochemical warfare 
lab while testifying during an investigative hearing, the contents of the lab 
could not be used as evidence against him.  
As can be seen, neither use immunity nor derivative use immunity prevents 
the suspect from being examined. They simply result in the exclusion of self-
incriminatory evidence in a subsequent proceedings. This prevents self-
incrimination in the full sense from occurring.131 Thus, while persons may have 
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their liberty abridged by losing their right to silence and by being compelled to 
speak about their own criminality at an investigative hearing without a case to 
meet having been shown, and while those persons may have to suffer the indig-
nity of speaking about their own criminal conduct, and while they may have to 
endure the cruel dilemma of whether to admit their involvement or lie, they will 
not be furnishing “evidence” against themselves. It is precisely because similar 
restraint is shown that the Charter permits the compelled testimony of suspects 
in aid of regulatory regimes, under statutory compulsion, and in the separate 
trials of confederates. So long as these persons are protected from having their 
answers and derivative evidence used against them to prove directly their 
criminal conduct, this will generally satisfy the Charter.  
The protection against use of the evidence to incriminate the witness will 
therefore go a long way in preserving section 83.28 from Charter-based self-
incrimination attack, but it may not get all the way there. In every one of the 
cases where compelled, self-incriminatory testimony has been upheld, it has 
been upheld because the proceedings or the statutory compulsion in question 
was serving a public function unconnected to the criminal investigation of the 
witness. By contrast, when used against a suspect, section 83.28 is not uncon-
nected to a criminal investigation of the witness. It is being used precisely as a 
form of criminal investigation.  
It has already been determined that even use immunity and derivative use 
immunity will not prevent a Charter violation, where the sole purpose of com-
pelling the testimony of a witness is to obtain incriminating information about 
that witness. It is contrary to the principles of fundamental justice to compel a 
person to testify in a proceedings solely so that the state can interrogate him 
under oath to obtain incriminating information about him. The state power to 
compel testimony is not supposed to be used as a substitute for investigation of 
persons who are compelled.132  
Even where there is some other, legitimate purpose for compelling the wit-
ness to testify, if the predominant purpose of compelling that testimony is to 
obtain self-incriminating information from that witness, the Charter might still 
be violated by requiring that testimony.133  
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These constitutional principles do not present a problem for subsection 
83.28(4)(b) interrogations because, where that subsection applies, the question-
ing is being done for the legitimate public purpose of forestalling a reasonably 
apprehended terrorist attack. Nor do these rules present a problem where sec-
tion 83.28(4)(a) is being used to compel testimony from someone who is not a 
suspect in an investigation into a crime that has occurred. Where, however, 
section 83.28(4)(a) is being used to conduct an investigative hearing of a sus-
pect into an offence that has already occurred, these rules will be breached, 
since the purpose of that investigative hearing will be to obtain incriminating 
information about the witness. This should not cause section 83.28(4)(a) to fail, 
since it is a provision that may be used either constitutionally or unconstitution-
ally. It will, however, deprive the provision of much of its utility because the 
Charter should prevent the section from being employed to interrogate terror-
ism suspects about their involvement in offences that have already occurred. 
The inability to use the investigative hearing procedure to compel suspects to 
testify against themselves would be a major setback to the legislation. One 
might not think so because the obvious question that arises from the very exis-
tence of use and derivative use immunity is, what will the government lose? 
They could not have used the testimony to prosecute the terrorist in any event. 
Why bother calling him at all? The answer is simple. It has to be remembered 
that this enactment is part of an international initiative. Allied countries are all 
claiming jurisdiction to try terrorism offences committed outside of their bor-
ders. In reality, given likely targets, there is less prospect of a Canadian terror-
ism investigation leading to a prosecution in Canada than there is in it being 
used to support an American investigation and prosecution of a suspect who 
has fled to Canada. A person subjected to an investigative hearing in Canada 
would not be able to claim the benefits of use immunity or derivative use im-
munity if deported for trial to the United States, because the United States is not 
bound by the Canadian Anti-Terrorism Act, just as American authorities are not 
bound by the Charter. Should section 7 be used to prevent the compelled testi-
mony altogether, it will therefore be a huge disappointment to the government. 
It will be unable to assist its allies by compelling suspects who will be tried in 
                                                                                                                                                              
(S.C.C.), Cory J. suggested that in all such cases, the witness will be exempted from testifying. 
Justice Sopinka took a less aggressive view in British Columbia (Securities Commission) v. Branch, 
id., at 143. In his view, the witness would be excused unless the Crown can justify any potential 
prejudice to the accused caused by the compelled testimony. Justice Sopinka suggested that if the 
only prejudice is the possible subsequent use of the testimony or derivative evidence, there will be 
no problem because ss. 13 and 7 prevent this form of prejudice from arising. With subs. 83.28, 
however, additional prejudice, in the form of the stigmatization and trauma of being interrogated as 
a suspect in a terrorist investigation, or the risk that admissions obtained could be used in foreign 
proceedings, may not be justifiable. 
226  Supreme Court Law Review (2002), 16 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
foreign jurisdictions to incriminate themselves in Canada in order to aid in their 
ultimate prosecution in that foreign jurisdiction. 
(d) Judicial Impartiality and Independence Challenges 
(i)  The Involvement of a Judge Should Make This Process More, Not Less 
Vulnerable to Charter Challenge 
The government is no doubt of the view that the presence of a judge at the 
time of the compelled testimony will support the reasonableness of this provi-
sion;134 had they adopted the hypothetical system posed above and required 
citizens to go directly to the police station to be interrogated, on pain of pun-
ishment for refusing, one might think the section would be a harder constitu-
tional sell. In fact, the opposite could be true. The Canadian Bar Association 
expressed concern about the involvement of judges in investigative hearings in 
its submissions before the legislative committees: “The investigative hearing 
provisions . . . bring the judiciary uncomfortably close to the police investiga-
tion activities.”135 That comment is too restrained. This is the most troubling 
feature of this provision from the perspective of our fundamental traditions. 
Judges are co-opted into the criminal investigative process. They are brought 
into the process for no other purpose than to husband the inquisition. They are 
not adjudicating anything. There are no factual controversies to resolve, or no 
legal question to be tried, other than those that arise incidentally to the interro-
gation. This is not even like a search warrant application where a judge is called 
on to pass judgment about whether the grounds exist for providing legal au-
thorization to invade privacy. While judges are not cast into the role of inquisi-
tors (neither posing the questions nor passing judgment at this proceedings) 
they are nonetheless expected to become part of the state’s investigation. This, 
in my opinion, is a startling and a serious contravention of those basic constitu-
tional norms that define the role of judges in our accusatorial, adversarial sys-
tem. This jeopardizes the entire section, irrespective of the limited protection 
given to the fact of self-incrimination under the Charter. 
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(ii)  The Meaning of Impartiality and Independence 
It is universally understood that judges are to be both independent and im-
partial. They could not discharge their function of conducting fair trials, or 
preserve the confidence of the public, if they were not. In my view, section 
83.28 implicates both independence and impartiality.  
“Although there is obviously a close relationship between independence and 
impartiality, they are . . . distinct values or requirements.”136 “Impartiality” 
refers to the state of mind or attitude of the tribunal in relation to the issue or 
the parties. It connotes the  
absence of bias. “Independence” connotes not merely a state of mind but a kind 
of “status or relationship to others, particularly to the executive branch of gov-
ernment.”137 The concept implies that judges should be free from executive or 
legislative encroachment.138 “Independence,” in turn, has “two dimensions,” the 
individual independence of the judge and the institutional or collective inde-
pendence of the court or tribunal of which the judge is a member.139 As Le Dain 
J. explained in Valente, even if an individual judge enjoys the essential condi-
tions of independence, if the court or tribunal over which he presides is not 
independent of other branches of government, the judge is not independent.140  
Judges must not only be impartial and independent. It is “important that a 
tribunal should be perceived as independent, as well as impartial, and that [like 
the test for impartiality] the test for independence should include that percep-
tion.”141 
(iii) The Myth of the Judge as a Non-Participant in the Investigation 
What impact does section 83.28 have on the impartiality or independence of 
the judiciary? It is always possible to rationalize matters and to say that the 
judge is there as a neutral player who can offer protection to the witnesses, 
thereby preserving impartiality and independence, but this, in my view, is 
unconvincing. The government is clearly counting on the oath of the witness 
and the threat of contempt of court to enforce this system, and it is using the 
power of the judicial office, not to obtain a legal ruling or to resolve a question 
of fact, but as a form of coercion to compel information in the advancement of 
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the executive, investigative function. The simple fact that section 83.28(4)(b) 
contemplates that other reasonable efforts must first be unsuccessfully under-
taken to attempt to get this information before section 83.28 is to be resorted to 
demonstrates as much. The judge is not simply a referee. Judicial power is 
conscripted by the government for coercive purposes. 
(iv)  Impartiality and Its Appearance 
The regime contemplated by section 83.28 will have no effect on the impar-
tiality of the judge conducting the investigative hearing unless she also presides 
over the ultimate trial, so actual impartiality is not a concern. It is the appear-
ance of impartiality on the part of the court that may be compromised. If, like 
independence, impartiality has both an individual and a court-based dimension, 
this will render the section unconstitutional. 
In my opinion, the use of courts as investigative tools must raise an appear-
ance of partiality. Can confidence be placed in the impartiality of a court that is 
trying accused persons, when judges of that same court have assisted the state 
in its investigations? Indeed, the fact that this can happen with respect to no 
other kind of investigation can only add to its tawdry appearance. I draw this 
conclusion even though apprehension of impartiality is to be adjudged through 
the eyes of the reasonable and informed person, familiar with the traditions of 
the criminal justice system.142 Since our common law traditions scrupulously 
avoid giving judges both an investigative and adjudicative function, and sepa-
rate the two precisely in order to avoid the loss of impartiality, it is doubtful 
that this reasonable and informed person would not apprehend bias. Indeed, not 
only have we separated the prosecutorial and judicial function, our tradition has 
been to limit the role of the judge in the evidence-gathering process even during 
a trial, for fear that the judge’s eyes will become clouded by the dust of com-
bat.143 Where a judge gets too involved in discovering evidence to the detriment 
of the accused, we consider that the accused has not had a fair trial.144 Even 
though the judge will not be the direct inquisitor during an “investigative hear-
ing,” the same principle is doubtlessly implicated. In our tradition, judges lose 
the appearance of neutrality if they get too close to investigative functions. 
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(v)  Independence and Its Appearance 
The central concern, however, is with independence. There is no need to 
craft novel conceptions of institutional partiality to make “independence” ar-
guments. Section 83.28 contravenes judicial independence, in my view, be-
cause it creates a rule of law that contemplates using the judge to facilitate or 
further the executive function of investigating crime. Again, it bears repeating 
that the judge is not facilitating that function by performing a judicial role and 
deciding such legal questions as whether, according to law, a warrant should 
issue. The judge is facilitating the investigation by presiding over an “investiga-
tive hearing.” Even though the legislation does not purport to command judges 
to perform this function, but leaves them with the discretion as to whether to 
conduct such a hearing,145 the appearance of independence is compromised. 
Indeed, the very decision by a judge to elect to participate raises a reasonable 
apprehension that the judge is not independent of the executive, having chosen 
to assist in the investigation.  
(vi)  The Technical Dimension 
If all of this is right, what implications does it have for section 83.29? The 
technical side of the matter is not straightforward. In the judicial independence 
cases, the parties argued section 11(d), the right of accused persons to a fair 
trial before an independent and impartial tribunal. There is no person charged 
with an offence at the investigative hearing, so section 11(d) does not apply 
directly. Section 7 may not directly apply either because it is not the investiga-
tive hearing that poses a risk to the liberty or security of the person of the ac-
cused.146 
Notwithstanding this, it is obvious that if independence or impartiality of the 
judiciary is compromised by this section, a means will be found to prevent that 
independence and impartiality from being violated. The most probable way of 
resolving the technical problem is for a court to find that if it were to conduct 
an investigative hearing, that would undermine the appearance of impartiality 
or independence in any and all subsequent trials. The court could then refuse to 
conduct the hearing to preserve its ultimate independence and to avoid tainting 
the repute of the administration of justice.  
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In Assn. (Manitoba) v. Manitoba (Minister of Justice)147 the Court relied on 
an unwritten constitutional principle, traced to the Act of Settlement of 1701148 
and affirmed in the preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867,149 to make orders 
relating to the financial security of judges. Similar reasoning could require a 
non-Charter-based challenge, in which the very jurisdiction of the legislative 
branch of government to pass this kind of law is questioned.  
One way or another, if “investigative hearings” do compromise impartiality 
or independence, the Constitution would prevent them from being conducted, 
and section 1 of the Charter could do nothing about it; when could it be demon-
strably justifiable in a free and democratic society for a court to surrender its 
impartiality or independence? To ask the question is to answer it.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Anti-Terrorism Act is important legislation. I am not opposed generally 
to its passage. It is not, however, without serious constitutional problems. Not-
withstanding honest efforts to make most of it Charter-compliant, there are 
excesses born of a natural enthusiasm for the critically important enterprise 
being undertaken. Where excesses happen in this fashion, it is the function of 
the Charter to roll them back.  
I have featured three key provisions in this paper. The first, the use of a gov-
ernment regulation as a substitute for in-court proof of an essential element of 
the “terrorist group” offences, is a reprehensible and frightening initiative. It 
cannot be allowed to succeed, no matter how pressing the terrorist problem, for 
it is nothing more than acceptance that persons should be convicted on the basis 
of reasonable beliefs, even in the absence of proof.  
The second, the so-called “Recognizance with Conditions” provision that al-
lows both arrest and recognizance, may fair slightly better. Many find the idea 
of restraining liberty because of the apprehension of future offences troubling, 
but the idea that this will be acceptable in some contexts has a significant pedi-
gree. If there is a problem, it is in the intolerably low standards used to spark 
detention and  
 
recognizance. At the very least, reasonable grounds should be required, and 
there are sound constitutional arguments supporting this view.  
The third provision examined, “investigative hearings,” is not unconstitu-
tional because of self-incrimination considerations, as is most commonly be-
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lieved, although such considerations could undermine the procedure where a 
suspect is being questioned about an offence that has already occurred. More 
important, though, is the fact that the form of “investigative hearings” devel-
oped in the Anti-Terrorism Act will compromise the appearance of judicial 
neutrality and independence. This should cause the whole scheme to fail. 
Whether I am right or wrong in these particular opinions, I have absolute 
confidence in this: the biggest threat posed by this legislation is that it will 
support a “creeping incrementalism” as the government borrows its tools, 
techniques and novel offences to combat less pressing and less exceptional 
criminal conduct. I fear that this enactment will become part of the fabric of the 
criminal law in this country, unless courts are scrupulous and governments 
conscientious. This statute is not just a threat to terrorists, or to those who are 
wrongly suspected of being terrorists based on creed or nationality, or even to 
those business people, professionals and charitable donors who deal with listed 
groups whom the government believes, without proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt, to be engaged in terrorist activity. If this enactment becomes in any 
measure the prototype for law reform, it is a threat to all of us. 
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